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COMMENTS
THE PROPER APPELLATE STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR
PROBABLE CAUSE TO ISSUE A SEARCH WARRANT
INTRODUCTION
The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that no
search warrant may be issued without probable cause.' This Com-
ment discusses the proper appellate standard for reviewing a magis-
trate's determination that probable cause existed at the time the
magistrate issued a search warrant.2
Recently, a panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit held, in United States v. Spears,3 that the proper standard
of appellate review for such determinations was the "clearly errone-
ous" standard of review4 used by appellate courts to review findings
of fact by district courts. 5 This holding reversed the Seventh Cir-
cuit's earlier decision in United States v. McKinney,6 where the
court found the proper standard to be whether the magistrate issu-
ing the search warrant had a "substantial basis" for finding proba-
ble cause.7 The court noted that the "substantial basis" standard
was held to encompass less deference to the magistrate's probable
I. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the person or things to be seized.
Id.
2. This Comment does not address, however, the proper appellate standard for a district court's
review of a magistrate's determination that probable cause to issue a search warrant existed.
Rather, this Comment is concerned only with appellate review of the magistrate's probable cause
finding after a district court has reviewed the same finding by the magistrate.
3. 965 F.2d 262, 271 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 502 (1992).
4. Id.
5. The "clearly erroneous" standard of review is also used by some federal appellate courts to
review the application of law to fact. See infra notes 44-65 and accompanying text.
6. 919 F.2d 405 (7th Cir. 1990).
7. Id.
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cause determination than clear error.8 However, one member of the
McKinney panel filed a concurring opinion arguing in favor of the
clearly erroneous standard of review in these situations.9
This Comment begins by examining the use of appellate stan-
dards of review in the search warrant context. The decisions of the
Seventh Circuit in Spears and McKinney are then presented. Next,
this Comment analyzes Supreme Court and federal appellate court
precedent for the clearly erroneous standard of review and its prac-
tical value. This Comment then discusses the potential impact of
Spears by predicting that the decision will simplify federal appellate
review and the search warrant process as well as encourage defend-
ants in the Seventh Circuit to seek Fourth Amendment protection.
Finally, this Comment concludes that McKinney was wrongly de-
cided and that the "substantial basis" standard of review should not
have been perceived as an intermediate deference standard. Rather,
the standard should be interpreted by other circuits as the
equivalent of the clearly erroneous standard for appellate review of
a magistrate's determination of probable cause to issue a search
warrant.
I. BACKGROUND
This section first discusses the use of appellate standards of re-
view and the process by which a magistrate issues a search warrant.
The leading Supreme Court decision concerning the issuance of
search warrants and appellate standards for reviewing their issuance
are examined. Further, the Supreme Court decision in United States
v. Leon,"0 which established a "good-faith exception" to the exclu-
sionary rule, is discussed. Leon supports the use of clear error review
by reducing the import of the probable cause determination made
by a magistrate." Federal interpretation of Illinois v. Gates, 2 as
well as the use of the clearly erroneous standard of review by appel-
late courts in cases that do not involve search warrants, are then
examined.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 418 (Posner, J., concurring).
10. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
11. See infra part III.B.3.
12. 462 U.S. 213 (1983)
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A. Appellate Standards of Review
There are five standards of appellate review in federal courts;
clear error, substantial evidence, substantial basis, abuse of discre-
tion, and de novo.13 The two predominant standards are clear error
and de novo.' 4
Appellate courts applying clear error review will defer to a lower
court's findings unless such findings of fact are clearly erroneous. 5
A clearly erroneous finding of fact by a lower court occurs "when
although there is evidence to support [the finding], the reviewing
court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm convic-
tiofi that a mistake has been committed."' 6 In the Seventh Circuit,
such a conviction may exist "if the trial judge's interpretation of the
facts is implausible, illogical, internally inconsistent or contradicted
by documentary or other extrinsic evidence.' 1 7 Further, "[w]here
there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder's
choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous."' 8 Thus, the
clearly erroneous standard of appellate review affords significantly
more deference to a lower court's determinations than does de novo
review. 9
13. See infra notes 15-32 and accompanying text.
14. See infra note 32.
15. FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a). The clearly erroneous standard of review applies to criminal cases as
well. See United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195, 1200 n.5 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 824 (1984) ("Although rule 52(a) is a rule of civil procedure, the clearly erroneous test
which it sets forth is applied in both civil and criminal proceedings.").
16. Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985) (quoting United States v.
United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)). In Anderson, the Supreme Court reversed
a Fourth Circuit decision which held that the findings of fact by the district court were clearly
erroneous. Id. at 580-81. The district court found that the plaintiff, a female applicant, had been
denied the position of recreation director of the city because of her gender in violation of Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII). Id. at 568. The district court further found that the
male applicant who was awarded the position was less qualified than the plaintiff, that the plaintiff
was asked questions that the other applicants were not asked, and that the male members of the
hiring committee had been biased against the plaintiff because she was a woman. Id. at 568-69. In
reversing the Fourth Circuit, the Supreme Court stated that because the district court's interpre-
tation of the facts were supported by the record, its findings could not have been clearly erroneous
and, therefore, should not have been reversed. Id. at 577.
17. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 839 F.2d 302, 309 (7th
Cir. 1988) (citations omitted). In this case, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
brought a Title VII sex discrimination suit against the defendant. Id. at 307. The district court
entered judgment for Sears. Id. In affirming the district court, the Seventh Circuit held that the
district court's findings were not clearly erroneous because they were supported by facts in the
record. Id. at 360.
18. Anderson, 470 U.S. at 574 (citations omitted).
19. Under clear error review, an appellate court may not reverse findings of fact by a district
court merely because the appellate court may have made different factual findings or interpreted
19931 1415
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The substantial evidence standard is related to the clear error
standard of review. The substantial evidence standard is based on
the premise that factual findings supported by substantial evidence
cannot be clearly erroneous." The standard is applied primarily for
appellate judicial review of administrative findings of fact,21 as well
as for appellate review of a magistrate's decision to issue a search
warrant.22 Federal courts interpret the substantial evidence standard
as encompassing equal or more deference than clear error review.2 3
This standard, which may or may not be the equivalent of clear
error review, will be discussed more fully in the Analysis section of
this Comment.2 4
The abuse of discretion standard is applied for appellate review of
the discretionary decisions of a trial court. 5 A trial court abuses its
discretion by failing to exercise sound, reasonable, and legal discre-
tion that is clearly against logic. 6 The Supreme Court has inter-
preted the abuse of discretion standard as equivalent to clear error
review. 7
The de novo standard28 assumes that the reviewing court is "the
front-line judicial authority" 29 and, therefore, pays no deference to a
lower court's determinations." De novo review is primarily applied
the same evidence differently. Steven A. Childress, "Clearly Erroneous':" Judicial Review Over
District Courts in the Eighth Circuit and Beyond, 51 Mo. L. REV. 93, 109 (1986).
20. Heidi M. Westby, Comment, Fourth Amendment Seizure: The Proper Standard for Ap-
pellate Review, 18 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 829, 833 (1992).
21. United States v. McKinney, 919 F.2d 405, 423 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J., concurring).
22. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238-39 (1983).
23. See Dillon v. M.S. Oriental Inventor, 426 F.2d 977, 978 (5th Cir.) (illustrating that the
substantial evidence standard is more deferential than clear error), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 903
(1970); Franks v. National Dairy Prods. Corp., 414 F.2d 682, 684 (5th Cir. 1969) (stating that
the substantial evidence standard is equivalent to clear error review).
24. See infra parts IlIl.A, III.B.
25. Westby, supra note 20, at 834; see, e.g., Lawson Prod., Inc. v. Avnet, Inc., 782 F.2d 1429
(7th Cir. 1986) (applying the abuse of discretion standard to the granting or denial of a prelimi-
nary injunction by a district court).
26. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 10 (6th ed. 1990). Abuse of discretion does not imply inten-
tional wrong, bad faith, or misconduct. Id.
27. Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 401 (1990) ("When an appellate court
reviews a district court's factual findings, the abuse of discretion and clearly erroneous standards
are indistinguishable: A court of appeals would be justified in concluding that a district court had
abused its discretion in making a factual finding only if the finding were clearly erroneous.").
28. The term "de novo" is Latin for "anew, afresh, a second time." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
435 (6th ed. 1990).
29. United States v. McKinney, 919 F.2d 405, 418 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J., concurring).
30. Evan Tsen Lee, Principled Decisionmaking and the Proper Role of Federal Appellate
Courts: The Mixed Questions Conflict, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 235, 246 (1991).
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to a lower court's conclusions of law.3 1
Clearly, the two main and root standards of appellate review are
clear error and de novo. 32 The use of these standards is examined
more closely in this section in order to determine their applicability
to the search warrant process.
B. The Choice of an Appellate Standard of Review
Both clear error and de novo review serve important judicial func-
tions. Clear error review serves two legal purposes. First, clear error
review minimizes judicial error because the trial court is in a better
position than the appellate court to evaluate and weigh the evi-
dence.3 3 Second, by applying clear error, the appellate court is re-
lieved of the burden of a complete and independent evidentiary re-
view, thereby enabling appellate judges to devote more of their time
and energy to reviewing questions of law. 4
31. Salve Regina College v. Russell, 111 S. Ct. 1217, 1221 (1991); United States v. McCon-
ney, 728 F.2d 1195, 1200-01 (9th Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 824 (1984). De novo
review is also called "plenary" review. Id. at 1201.
32. Clear error and de novo are the main standards of review for two reasons. First, the stan-
dards are used for appellate review of independent and clearly discernible actions of a lower court;
clear error review is used for reviewing findings of fact, see supra notes 15-18 and accompanying
text, while de novo review is used for reviewing conclusions of law, see supra note 31 and accom-
panying text. Second, the substantial evidence, substantial basis, and abuse of discretion standards
of review can be considered variations of clear error review. The abuse of discretion standard had
been interpreted by the Supreme Court as the equivalent of clear error review, see supra note 30
and accompanying text, and the substantial basis standard has been interpreted by some circuits
to be the equivalent of clear error review, see infra parts ILA, lI.B. Furthermore, the substantial
evidence standard of review is derived from clear error review and allows at least as much defer-
ence as clear error review. See supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text.
33. Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 403 (1990).
34. McConney, 728 F.2d at 1201; see also infra notes 243-44 and accompanying text. In Mc-
Conney. the Ninth Circuit held that de novo review was appropriate where the existence of exi-
gent circumstances excused federal officers from their failure to wait for the defendant to refuse
them access to his home before they entered. Id. at 1205. Exigent circumstances were defined as
"those circumstances that would cause a reasonable person to believe that entry (or other relevant
prompt action) was necessary to prevent physical harm to the officers or other persons, the de-
struction of relevant evidence, the escape of the suspect, or some other consequence improperly
frustrating legitimate law enforcement efforts." Id. at 1199. The Ninth Circuit further stated that
the "concerns of judicial administration - efficiency, accuracy, and precedential weight" -
would determine whether applications of law to fact should be subject to clear error or de novo
review. Id. at 1202.
The Supreme Court has also discussed the value of the clearly erroneous standard to review
questions of fact involving the credibility of witnesses. See Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 114
(1985). In Miller, the Supreme Court stated that a high degree of deference was appropriate
because the trial court was in a better position to evaluate the demeanor of witnesses and to assess
bias. Id. In contrast, de novo review was appropriate to compensate for the "'perceived shortcom-
ings of the trier of fact by way of bias or some other factor .... " Id. (quoting Bose Corp. v.
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De novo review by appellate courts also serves important judicial
functions. The Supreme Court has recognized that "trial judges
often must resolve complicated legal questions without benefit of
" 'extended reflection' " or " 'extensive information.' "35 There are
several reasons for this. District judges, who preside over "fast-
paced" trials, necessarily must devote most of their energy and re-
sources to hearing witnesses and reviewing evidence.3 6 Furthermore,
trial counsel is limited in its ability to assist the legal research of
district judges with memoranda and briefs because of the time pres-
sures surrounding a trial.3 7 On the other hand, federal courts of ap-
peals are in a better position to produce accurate legal decisions by
applying independent'de novo review. At the time of the appeal, the
factual record has been constructed by the district court and settled
for purposes of appellate review, enabling appellate judges to
"devote their primary attention to legal issues."38 Since legal issues
are the focus of appellate review, appellate counsel briefs will ad-
dress these issues more extensively than at trial and provide appel-
late judges with more information and more comprehensive legal
analysis.3 9 Additionally, the judgment of at least three members of
an appellate panel is brought to bear on every case, minimizing the
chance of judicial error.4 0 Minimal judicial error is necessary be-
cause appellate rulings of law become controlling precedent and af-
fect the rights of future litigants."' Thus, the appellate court has the
primary responsibility to decide questions of law under the de novo
standard because such courts are in the best position to do so.42
Serving important judicial functions, both clear error and de novo
review have been used for appellate review of applications of law to
Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 518 (1984) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)).
35. Salve Regina College v. Russell, I ll S. Ct. 1217, 1221 (1991) (quoting Dan T. Coenen, To
Defer or Not to Defer. A Study of Federal Circuit Court Deference to District Court Rulings on
State Law, 73 MINN. L. REV. 899, 923 (1989)).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Justice Felix Frankfurter had earlier described the appropriateness of permitting appellate
courts to review questions of law as follows: "Without adequate study there cannot be adequate
reflection; without adequate reflection there cannot be adequate discussion; without adequate dis-
cussion there cannot be that fruitful interchange of minds which is indispensable to thoughtful,
unhurried decision and its formulation in learned and impressive opinions." Dick v. New York
Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 437, 458-59 (1959) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
1418 [Vol. 42:1413
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fact, which are also called mixed questions.43 An application of law
to fact is the use of a legal standard to evaluate a set of facts which
are not in dispute." A magistrate's decision to issue a search war-
rant is an application of law to fact because a legal standard is ap-
plied to a set of undisputed facts. 5
The Supreme Court has explicitly refused to address the applica-
bility of the clearly erroneous standard of review to applications of
law to fact. 4' The Court has stated that deferential review of mixed
questions is appropriate when the district court is "better posi-
tioned" than the appellate court to decide the issue or when appel-
late review will not contribute to the clarity of legal doctrine.47
However, the Court has never discussed when a district court is
"better positioned" outside of these specific factual contexts. The
Court has held that one specific factual finding, the determination of
actual malice under the First Amendment as established by the
43. Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 289 n.19 (1982) (discussing the applicability of
the clearly erroneous standard of review to applications of law to fact).
44. Id.
45. United States v. Rambis, 686 F.2d 620, 622 (7th Cir. 1982). In Rambis, the Seventh Cir-
cuit stated:
Whether the information in the affidavit establishes probable cause [to issue a search
warrant] is a determination based solely on written evidence. Since this determination
involves the application of law rather than an evaluation of factual evidence, on re-
view the appellate court is not limited to a determination of whether the district
court's finding was clearly erroneous. It must independently review the sufficiency of
the affidavit ....
Id. Thus, the Seventh Circuit classifies the question of whether probable cause to issue a search
warrant exists as an application of law to fact.
46. Pullman-Standard, 456 U.S. at 289 n.19. In Pullman-Standard, the Court, when con-
fronted with the validity of a seniority system maintained by the defendant-petitioners under Title
VII, stated:
We need not, therefore, address the much-mooted issue of the applicability of the
Rule 52(a) [clearly erroneous] standard to mixed questions of law and fact - i.e.,
questions in which the historical facts are admitted or established, the rule of law is
undisputed, and the issue is whether the facts satisfy the statutory standard, or to put
it another way, whether the rule of law as applied to the established facts is or is not
violated. There is substantial authority in the Circuits on both sides of this question.
Id.
47. Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 114 (1985) (holding that the voluntariness of a confession
is a legal question subject to de novo review); see also Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S.
384, 402-04 (1990) (adopting the deferential abuse of discretion standard, which the Court inter-
preted to be equivalent to clear error, for appellate review of the imposition of Rule II sanctions
by a district court).
The imposition of Rule I I sanctions by a district court may be considered a mixed question of
applying law to fact because the district court must determine whether the legal action is "frivo-
lous" based on the facts surrounding the action. Mars Steel Corp. v. Continental Bank N.A., 880
F.2d 928, 933 (7th Cir. 1989).
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Court in New York Times v. Sullivan,48 is subject to de novo review
by appellate courts,49 in spite of acknowledging that actual malice
involves "purely factual" issues of a defendant's intent, knowledge,
and state of mind.5" This holding is an exception to Rule 52(a)'s
clearly erroneous standard 1 because of the First Amendment rights
implicated, and it is not applicable to other factual issues.52
The apparent indecisiveness of the Supreme Court has been rec-
ognized by federal appellate courts, which apply both clear error
and de novo review to mixed questions. Appellate courts differ, how-
ever, as to when clear error and de novo review should be applied to
mixed questions. 53  The First 54  and Seventh 55 Circuits apply the
clear error standard of review for all mixed questions. The Second,56
48. 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
49. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485 (1984).
50. Id. at 507-09.
51. FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
52. Bose Corp., 466 U.S. at 503-11.
53. See Lee, supra note 30, at 247-56 (arguing that clear error review for appellate review of
all mixed questions is the only standard consistent with the proper role of appellate courts).
54. Professor Lee has identified the First and Seventh Circuits as the only circuits applying
clear error review for all mixed questions. Id. at 239; see, e.g., McLaughlin v. Hogar San Jose,
Inc., 865 F.2d 12, 14 (lst.Cir. 1989) (reviewing the good faith and reasonableness of an em-
ployer's action under the Fair Labor Standards Act); Curley v. Mobil Oil Corp., 860 F.2d 1129,
1132 (1st Cir. 1988) (reviewing a breach of sales contract for failure to arrange a closing within a
reasonable time); Sweeney v. Board of Trustees, 604 F.2d 106, 109 n.2 (1st Cir. 1979) (applying
the clear error standard in a Title VII action), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1045 (1980).
55. See, e.g., Mars Steel Corp. v. Continental Bank N.A., 880 F.2d 928, 933 (7th Cir. 1989)
(reviewing for clear error a district court's decision to impose Rule 11 sanctions in civil cases);
United States v. D'Antoni, 856 F.2d 975, 978-79 (7th Cir. 1988) (reviewing for clear error a
district court's denial of a motion to suppress evidence which called for the application of the legal
rule that "an arrest may not be used as a mere pretext to avoid the warrant requirement of the
fourth amendment" to the district court's findings of fact); United States v. Binder, 794 F.2d
1195, 1198-99 (7th Cir.) (reviewing for clear error the classification of property as "abandoned"
by a district court and the credibility witnesses at a suppression hearing), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
869 (1986); Mucha v. King, 792 F.2d 602, 605 (7th Cir. 1986) (reviewing for clear error the legal
possession of a painting).
The legal standard at issue in United States v. Binder was described by the Fifth Circuit in a
subsequent decision as:
Abandonment [of property] is primarily a question of intent, and intent may be in-
ferred from words spoken, acts done, and other objective facts . . . . The issue is not
abandonment in the strict property-right sense, but whether the person prejudiced by
the search had voluntarily discarded, left behind, or otherwise relinquished his interest
in the property in question so that he could no longer retain a reasonable expectation
of privacy with regard to it at the time of the search.
United States v. Colbert, 474 F.2d 174, 176 (5th Cir. 1973) (citations omitted). This definition of
the legal standard was explicitly relied upon in Binder. See Binder, 794 F.2d at 1198. The Binder
defendant did not dispute any of the relevant facts but, rather, disputed the interpretation of those
facts. Id. at 1199.
56. Professor Lee has identified the Second, Third, Eighth, and D.C. Circuits as adopting this
1420
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Third,57 Eighth,5" and District of Columbia 59 Circuits apply de novo
review to mixed questions. The Ninth and Tenth Circuits apply ei-
ther clear error or de novo review based on "concerns of judicial
administration - efficiency, accuracy, and precedential weight." 60
The Fourth,61 Fifth,62 Sixth,6" and Eleventh Circuits64 apply both
rule. Lee, supra note 30, at 241-43; see, e.g., Sobiech v. International Staple & Machine Co., 867
F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1989) (reviewing the implication of a contract warranty under the de novo
standard); Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 751 F.2d 117 (2d Cir.
1984) (reviewing de novo the contacts of a corporate defendant in the forum state).
57. See, e.g., Bennerson v. Small, 842 F.2d 710, 713-14 (3d Cir.) (reviewing de novo the status
of a person as a bona fide purchaser), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 845 (1988); Universal Minerals, Inc.
v. C.A. Hughes & Co., 669 F.2d 98, 102 (3d Cir. 1981) (stating that "ultimate facts," consisting
of mixtures of fact and legal precept, should be reviewed de novo).
58. Besta v. Beneficial Loan Co., 855 F.2d 532, 533 (8th Cir. 1988) (reviewing de novo the
unconscionability of a loan contract); United States v. Campbell, 843 F.2d 1089, 1092 (8th Cir.
1988) (reviewing de novo the constitutionality of the seizure of the defendant); Hill v. Blackwell,
774 F.2d 338, 343 (8th Cir. 1985) (reviewing de novo the constitutionality of a prison regulation
prohibiting beards).
59. See, e.g., United States v. Yunis, 859 F.2d 953, 958 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (reviewing de novo
the voluntary and knowledgeable waiver of a defendant's Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights);
Carter v. Bennett, 840 F.2d 63, 64-65 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (reviewing de novo the reasonableness of
an employer's accommodation under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973); Blitz v. Donovan, 740 F.2d
1241, 1244 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (reviewing de novo the issue of whether the government's position
was "substantially justified" under the Equal Access to Justice Act).
60. United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195, 1202 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 824
(1984). In McConney, the Ninth Circuit concluded that de novo review was appropriate for most
applications of law to fact because "usually the application of law to fact will require the consider-
ation of legal concepts and involve the exercise of judgment about the values underlying legal
principles." Id. The Ninth Circuit stated that de novo review was particularly appropriate for
mixed questions which implicate constitutional rights. Id. at 1203-04. Thus, the Ninth Circuit
concluded that, absent an exception, mixed questions would be reviewed independently. Id. at
1204. The Ninth Circuit did note two exceptions to its conclusion favoring de novo review: (1)
mixed questions that involve strictly factual tests (such as state of mind) and (2) mixed questions
of negligence. Id.
The Ninth Circuit also determined that the mixed question of whether exigent circumstances
existed to excuse the failure of law enforcement officers to await refusal of admittance before
entering a home should be reviewed under a de novo standard rather than a clearly erroneous test
because the question was not "essentially factual." Id. at 1205. In applying this standard, the
Ninth Circuit conducted its own review of the record and concluded that exigent circumstances
were present. Id. at 1206.
The Tenth Circuit has explicitly adopted the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit in McConney.
Supre v. Ricketts, 792 F.2d 958, 961 (10th Cir. 1986).
61. Lee, supra note 30, at 245-47; see, e.g., United States v. Stokley, 881 F.2d 114, 116 (4th
Cir. 1989) (implying that both clear error and de novo review are appropriate for mixed ques-
tions); Rawl v. United States, 778 F.2d 1009, 1014 n.9 (4th Cir.) (stating that a majority of
courts has upheld an appellate court exercising independent review), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 814
(1985); Bonds v. Mortensen & Lange, 717 F.2d 123, 125 (4th Cir. 1983) (implying that mixed
questions are reviewable under either clear error or de novo).
62. United States v. Muniz-Melchor, 894 F.2d 1430, 1439 n.9 (5th Cir.) (reviewing de novo
the question of whether law enforcement officers had probable cause to conduct a warrantless
search, but reviewing for clear error the issue of whether the defendant consented to inspection of
DEPA UL LA W RE VIE W [Vol. 42:1413
clear error and de novo review to mixed questions.
Before appellate standards to review the issuance of the warrant
may be applied, the process by which a search warrant is issued
must be understood. This process is examined next.
C. The Search Warrant Process
Absent a specified exception, the Fourth Amendment to the
Constitution generally requires the issuance of a search warrant
before a search of property can be conducted for law enforcement
purposes.6 5
The Fourth Amendment and Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure specify the three constitutional requirements for
a valid search. First, the Fourth Amendment requires a determina-
tion of probable cause before a search warrant may be issued.6" Sec-
ond, the showing of probable cause must be supported by an oath or
affirmation.67 Third, the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized, must be described with particularity by law en-
forcement personnel.6" The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
specify several requirements as well. A search warrant may be is-
sued by "a federal magistrate or a state court of record within the
a tank mounted in his trunk), cert. denied. 495 U.S. 923 (1990). In Muniz-Melchor the legal
standard of consent was described as follows:
"Consent to search must be given knowingly and voluntarily under the 'totality of the
circumstances.' We have outlined six primary factors to consider in making this deter-
mination: (I) the voluntariness of the defendant's custodial status; (2) the presence of
coercive police procedure; (3) the extent and level of the defendant's cooperation with
the police; (4) the defendant's awareness of his right to refuse consent; (5) the defend-
ant's education and intelligence; and (6) the defendant's belief that no incriminating
evidence will be found. All of these factors are relevant, but none of the six is
dispositive."
894 F.2d at 1439 (quoting United States v. Tedford, 875 F.2d 446, 451-52 (5th Cir. 1989) (cita-
tions omitted)).
63. See, e.g., Wynn Oil Co. v. Thomas, 839 F.2d 1183, 1186 (6th Cir. 1988) (applying clear
error review to findings of fact, but de novo review to questions of law); K & M Joint Venture v.
Smith Int'l, Inc., 669 F.2d 1106, 1111 (6th Cir. 1982) (stating that in mixed questions of fact and
law, the court is "not bound by the clearly erroneous standard").
64. Hawkins v. Ceco Corp., 883 F.2d 977, 981 n.4 (11th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 935
(1990); United States v. Malekzadeh, 855 F.2d 1492, 1496 (11th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489
U.S. 1029, and cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1024 (1989).
65. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 761-69 (1969) (discussing the search incident to a
lawful arrest doctrine as an exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment).
66. U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV.
67. Id.
68. Id.
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federal district." '69 A federal warrant may be issued to search for
and seize the following:
(1) property that constitutes evidence of the commission of a criminal of-
fense; or (2) contraband, the fruits of a crime, or things otherwise criminally
possessed; or (3) property designed or intended for use or which is or has
been used as the means of committing a criminal offense; or (4) person for
whose arrest there is probable cause, or who is unlawfully restrained.7 0
A federal warrant may be issued only upon a sworn written oath or
"sworn oral testimony communicated by telephone or other appro-
priate means' 71 that establishes the grounds for issuing the war-
rant.72 The warrant must be served upon the appropriate person in
the daytime unless, "for reasonable cause shown," the execution of
the warrant at night is authorized.73 The search must be conducted
"within a specified period of time not to exceed 10 days."74
Prior to the issuance of a warrant, evidence is presented to the
magistrate ex parte, or outside the presence of the defendant. Ex
parte proceedings are necessary in order to prevent the destruction
or removal of evidence sought by the warrant.7 5 In Franks v. Dela-
ware,76 the Supreme Court held that a defendant, in limited situa-
tions, has a right to a hearing subsequent to the seizure of evidence
to challenge the veracity of the affidavits or other sworn statements
which were presented to the magistrate before the issuance of the
warrant (Franks hearing).7 7 The search warrant affidavit is pre-
sumed to be valid.7 8 In order to receive a Franks hearing, the de-
fendant must allege deliberate falsehood or reckless disregard for
the truth by the affiant, accompanied by an offer of proof.79 The
defendant should specify the false portion of the warrant affidavit
and supplement the allegation with a statement of supporting rea-
sons.8 0 The defendant must furnish affidavits or sworn or "otherwise
69. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(a)(1).
70. Id. 41(b).
71. Id. 41(c)(2)(A).
72. Id. 41(c)(2)(C).
73. Id. 41(c)(1).
74. Id.
75. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 169 (1978).
76. 438 U.S. 154 (1978).
77. Id. at 169. The hearing is called a "Franks hearing." See, e.g., United States v. Sobamowo,
892 F.2d 90, 93 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (discussing the requirements to obtain a Franks hearing), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 825 (1990).
78. Franks, 438 U.S. at 171.
79. Id.
80. Id.
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reliable" statements, or she must "satisfactorily" explain their ab-
sence.81 If the remaining truthful content of the search warrant affi-
davit is sufficient to establish probable cause, no Franks hearing is
required.82 The determination by a district court that the Franks
requirements have not been satisfied is subject to clear error review
by an appellate court.83
Law enforcement officers may conduct warrantless searches.8 Al-
though warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable, the
Supreme Court recognizes several exceptions to the presumption.85
One exception is automobiles - law enforcement officers may con-
duct a warrantless search of an automobile and may subsequently
seize contraband, without violating the Fourth Amendment, if such
actions are taken upon probable cause. 8  Another example is exigent
81. Id.
82. Id. at 171-72.
83. See, e.g., United States v. Parcels of Land, 903 F.2d 36, 46 (Ist Cir.) (stating that the
determination by a district court that the requisites of a Franks hearing have not been satisfied
will be reviewed under the clear error standard), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 916 (1990); United States
v. Rumney, 867 F.2d 714, 720 (lst Cir.) ("A district court's determination that a defendant has
not made the requisite [Franks] showing . . . will be upheld unless clearly erroneous."), cert.
denied, 491 U.S. 908 (1989). Appellate review of this determination, while related, is not
equivalent to appellate review of a magistrate's finding that probable cause existed to issue the
search warrant because the affidavit could still establish probable cause absent the alleged falsity
or reckless disregard for the truth. See Franks, 438 U.S. at 171 ("[I]f, when material that is
subject to the alleged falsity or reckless disregard is set to one side, there remains sufficient con-
tent in the warrant to support a finding of probable cause, no hearing is required."). This Com-
ment addresses only the issue of appellate review of probable cause to issue the search warrant,
not appellate review of the veracity of a search warrant affidavit.
84. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
85. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 717 (1984); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390
(1978); Katz, 389 U.S. at 357.
86. See, e.g., United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982) (holding that police officers who have
legitimately stopped an automobile and have probable cause to believe that contraband is con-
cealed within it may conduct a warrantless search); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 52
(1970) (holding that police officers who had legitimately stopped an auto and had probable cause
to believe contraband was concealed in the auto, could conduct a warrantless search); Carroll v.
United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925) (stating that police officers who had probable cause to
believe that intoxicating liquor was being transported could conduct a warrantless search).
The scope of a search differs depending on the place to be searched. In Carroll, the Supreme
Court stated:
We have made a somewhat extended reference to these statutes to show that the
guaranty of freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures by the Fourth Amend-
ment has been construed, practically since the beginning of the Government, as recog-
nizing a necessary difference between a search of a store, dwelling house or other
structure in respect of which a proper official warrant readily may be obtained, and a
search of a ship, motor boat, wagon, or automobile, for contraband goods, where it is
not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of
the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.
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circumstances - law enforcement officers may conduct warrantless
entry into, and searches of, residences if exigent circumstances exist
and there has been a sufficient showing of probable cause.87 A third
exception is where the owner of the property consents to the
search. 8
The scopes of warrant and warrantless searches of identical places
are the same, 89 and both require an agent of the government to de-
termine whether an existing set of facts supports a determination of
probable cause.9" The main difference for purposes of appellate re-
view between warrantless and warrant searches is that in a nonwar-
rant search, the probable cause determination is initially made by a
law enforcement officer and reviewed by a district judge, while in
warrant searches, the probable cause determination is initially made
by a magistrate. 91
Id. at 153.
This holding was subsequently followed by Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970), in which
the Supreme Court stated that "for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment there is a constitu-
tional difference between houses and cars." Id. at 52.
87. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980) (holding that an arrest warrant was required for
police officers to constitutionally enter the defendant's apartment and seize a shell casing used at
the defendant's subsequent trial).
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals has enumerated six relevant factors to determine
whether a warrantless search of a residence is constitutional. See Dorman v. United States, 435
F.2d 385, 392-93 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (en banc). These factors are: (I) a grave offense is involved;
(2) the suspect is reasonably believed to be armed; (3) a clear showing of probable cause has been
made; (4) the police have strong reason to believe the suspect is in the premises being entered; (5)
there is a likelihood the suspect will escape if not swiftly apprehended; and (6) the unconsented
law enforcement entry is being made peaceably. Id. at 392-93. The court also noted that the time
of entry is relevant; if at night, it would be more justifiable to proceed without a warrant. Id. at
393.
A District of Columbia Court of Appeals decision subsequent to Dorman stated that not all the
above factors need be present for a warrantless search to be constitutional. See United States v.
Robinson, 533 F.2d 578, 583-84 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (en banc) (distinguishing Dorman because
there is a lesser expectation of privacy in a car than in a home and because the police entry into
the car, strongly believed to be the getaway car, was justified even though the suspect was plainly
not inside), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 956 (1976).
88. See, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (recognizing a consent exception
to the warrant requirement).
89. See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 824 (1982) (stating that the scope of a warrant-
less search of an automobile is defined by the object of the search and the place or places in which
there is probable cause to believe the object may be found). Warrant and warrantless searches
have the same scope because both are considered searches within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment, United States v. Spears, 965 F.2d 262, 270 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 502
(1992), and the Supreme Court has never limited the scope of a valid warrantless search merely
because the search was not conducted pursuant to a warrant.
90. See Spears, 965 F.2d at 271 (stating that it is the front-line judicial officer who determines
whether there is probable cause).
91. Id.
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Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides a
defendant with two means at the trial level to challenge the validity
of evidence seized by law enforcement officers: (1) a motion for re-
turn of property and (2) a motion to suppress evidence. 92 Although
these motions may be made whether the search has been performed
with or without a warrant, the defendant has the burden of proving
an invalid search if a search warrant was executed. 93 A motion for
return of property must be made before the filing of an indictment
or information9" and must be made in a district court for the district
in which the property was seized.95 It is based on the defendant's
entitlement to lawful possession of the property.96 The motion to
suppress evidence is more commonly used in federal court.9 This
motion, governed by Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure, must be made prior to trial. 8 The motion may be written or
oral at the discretion of the judge.99 If the motion is granted, the
seized evidence may not be used at trial. If the motion is denied and
the defendant is subsequently convicted, the defendant may chal-
lenge the validity of the search warrant on appeal.1 00
As stated earlier, the Constitution requires that probable cause
exist if a magistrate's issuance of a search warrant is to be found
valid.101
D. Probable Cause to Search
The Fourth Amendment requires that all arrests and searches be
based upon probable cause, even if a warrant is not present.102 The
Supreme Court has decided that probable cause for a search war-
rant exists when "given all the circumstances set forth in the affida-
92. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e), 41(f).
93. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56 (1978) (holding that a defendant had the bur-
den of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that sworn statements in a search warrant
affidavit were false or demonstrated a reckless disregard for the truth).
94. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e).
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. i WILLIAM E. RINGEL, SEARCHES AND SEIZURES. ARRESTS AND CONFESSIONS § 7.2
(1991).
98. FED. R. CRIM. PRO. 12(B).
99. Id.
100. See United States v. Barnes, 909 F.2d 1059, 1068 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that a defend-
ant who had failed to challenge at trial the particularity of the description in a search warrant
thereby waived the argument on appeal).
101. See supra note I and accompanying text.
102. Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959).
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vit before [the magistrate] . . . there is a fair probability that con-
traband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular
place." 103 The Fourth Amendment generally requires that the evi-
dence be presently located in the relevant area and that the defend-
ant be allowed to make a motion to suppress the evidence on the
ground that the data used by law enforcement officers to obtain the
search warrant was too "stale" to establish probable cause. 104 In
1983, the Supreme Court established the current definition of prob-
able cause to issue a search warrant in Illinois v. Gates. 0 5
1. Illinois v. Gates
The leading Supreme Court decision concerning both the defini-
tion of probable cause to issue a search warrant and the proper ap-
pellate standard of review for a magistrate's probable cause deter-
mination is Illinois v. Gates.06 In that case, the Supreme Court
overruled two prior cases and endorsed a loose "totality-of-the-cir-
cumstances" analysis for magistrates to utilize when issuing search
warrants.10 7
103. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983). The term "fair probability" was not defined
by the Supreme Court in Gates, but the Court stated that "[flinely tuned standards such as proof
beyond a reasonable doubt or by a preponderance of the evidence, useful in formal trials, have no
place in the magistrate's decision." Id. at 235. Therefore, it appears that there is no threshold
evidentiary standard which establishes fair probability that criminal evidence will be located in a
particular area.
104. Sgro v. United States, 287 U.S. 206, 210-11 (1932) (holding that under the National
Prohibition Act of June 15, 1917, a warrant to search for intoxicating liquor became void at the
expiration of ten days from the date of its issuance and may not be revived without additional or
new information present in the law enforcement officer's affidavit).
105. 462 U.S. at 238.
106. 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
107. Id. at 213. Specifically, the Supreme Court stated:
The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, common-sense deci-
sion whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, includ-
ing the "veracity" and "basis of knowledge" of persons supplying hearsay informa-
tion, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in
a particular place.
Id.
Prior to Gates, magistrates, in determining probable cause to issue a search warrant, were re-
quired to apply a two-prong test under the Supreme Court's decisions in Aguilar v. Texas, 378
U.S. 108 (1964), and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969). Under this test, a magistrate
assessing probable cause to issue a warrant had to: (1) evaluate the credibility of the sources of
information and (2) if the source was credible, evaluate the information accepted as true and
determine the probabilities emerging from that data. Charles E. Moylan, Jr., Hearsay and Proba-
ble Cause: An Aguilar and Spinelli Primer, 25 MERCER L. REv. 741, 747-50 (1974). Alterna-
tively, the test has been described as requiring that the affidavit: (1) establish the informant's
"basis of knowledge" and (2) give sufficient facts to establish either the informant's "veracity" or
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In Gates, the Bloomingdale, Illinois Police Department received
an anonymous letter alleging that the defendants were selling drugs.
The letter also predicted one of the defendant's future travel plans
between Illinois and Florida, which subsequently occurred."° This
letter was held sufficient to establish probable cause to search the
defendants' car and home based upon the corroboration of the letter
by a detective of the Bloomingdale Police Department and the Drug
Enforcement Agency, both of whom conducted independent investi-
gations of the Gateses. The letter also contained detailed informa-
tion concerning the Gateses' future travel plans that was "ordinarily
not predicted," suggesting that the letter writer had received the in-
formation from the Gateses or from someone they trusted.10 9 The
fact that Florida was well known to law enforcement officers as a
source of illegal drugs, the flight of Lance Gates to West Palm
Beach, his brief stay in a motel, and his immediate return to Chi-
cago also were "suggestive of a prearranged drug run."110
The Gates Court formulated a looser test of probable cause for
magistrates to follow when determining whether to issue a search
warrant." The Court cited several policy reasons in support of this
new test. It first declared that both search and arrest warrants had
previously been issued by persons without legal training and that
this practice had been ruled constitutional." 2 In these situations, the
Court reasoned, a technical test of probable cause, imposing com-
plex "evidentiary and analytical rules," would be inappropriate for
the "reliability" of the information provided by the informant. I RINGEL, supra note 96, § 4.3(a).
In Gates, the Supreme Court addressed the two-prong test as follows:
We do not agree, however, that these elements should be understood as entirely sepa-
rate and independent requirements to be rigidly exacted in every case, which the opin-
ion of the Supreme Court of Illinois would imply. Rather, as detailed below, they
should be understood simply as closely intertwined issues that may usefully illuminate
the common-sense, practical question whether there is "probable cause" to believe
that contraband or evidence is located in a particular place.
Gates, 462 U.S. at 230. In Gates, details of the informant's tip were corroborated by actual
events, including the defendant's "flight to West Palm Beach, his brief, overnight stay in a motel,
and apparent immediate return north to Chicago in the family car." Id. at 243. Thus, Gates also
established the proposition that actual corroboration of an informant's data is an important factor
to consider when applying the "totality of the circumstances" test.
108. Gates, 462 U.S. at 225-26.
109. Id. at 245-46. The letter was held sufficient to establish probable cause despite the fact
that neither the police nor the Illinois judge knew the writer's identity and source of information.
Id.
110. Id. at 243.
111. Id. at 213; see also supra note 107.
112. Gates, 462 U.S. at 235 (citing Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345, 348-50 (1972)).
1428 [Vol. 42:1413
1993] PROPER APPELLATE REVIEW 1429
"laymen" to follow. 113 The rushed context in which many search
warrants were issued further made the use of a complicated proba-
ble cause test inappropriate. 1 4 The Court next stated that a stricter
test of probable cause would encourage police to conduct warrant-
less searches.' 5 This would be undesirable because a search warrant
reduces the intrusion upon constitutionally protected privacy inter-
ests. 1 Finally, the Court pointed out that continued application of
the two-prong test in probable cause determinations would effec-
tively bar the use of anonymous tips by law enforcement officers, 1 7
and this result was inconsistent with "[t]he most basic function of
any government: to provide for the security of the individual and of
his property." 11 8 The Court noted that anonymous tips frequently
reveal the perpetrators of previously unsolved crimes. 19 For these
reasons, the Court favored application of the totality-of-the-circum-
stances test. 2'
The Gates Court also considered the proper role of appellate
courts in evaluating a magistrate's determination of probable cause
in warrant cases. The Court stated that "the duty of a reviewing
court is simply to ensure that the magistrate had a 'substantial basis
for . . . conclud[ing]' that probable cause existed."12' The Supreme
113. Id. at 235-36.
114. Id. at 236.
115. Id. The Supreme Court stated that more warrantless searches would likely be conducted
because police would later seek to validate a warrantless search by attempting to establish that'the
owner of the property consented. Id. Alternatively, police would attempt to establish that some
other exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment existed in order to later
validate a warrantless search. Id.
116. Id. at 237 n.10.
117. Id. at 237. Anonymous tips would become useless because "the veracity of persons supply-
ing anonymous tips is by hypothesis largely unknown, and unknowable." Id. Consequently, anony-
mous tips would fail the first part of the Aguilar-Spinelli test.
118. Id. (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 539 (1966) (White, J., dissenting)).
119. Id. at 238.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 238-39 (quoting Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 271 (1960)). In Jones v.
United States, the defendant was convicted of violating two federal narcotics laws. 362 U.S. 257,
258 (1960). The evidence used to convict the defendant was obtained pursuant to a search war-
rant based entirely on an affidavit from a member of the District of Columbia police department.
The defendant argued that the affidavit was insufficient to establish probable cause to issue the
warrant. Id. at 268-69. In holding that the affidavit was sufficient for a U.S. commissioner to issue
a search warrant, the Supreme Court stated, "The Commissioner need not have been convinced of
the presence of narcotics in the apartment. He might have found the affidavit insufficient and
withheld his warrant. But there was substantial basis for him to conclude that narcotics were
probably present in the apartment, and that is sufficient." Id. at 271. Thus, the term "substantial
basis" was not explicitly stated by the Supreme Court to be a standard of appellate review, and
the Supreme Court did not discuss the term "substantial basis" further in its opinion.
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Court declared that in warrant cases, "[a] magistrate's 'determina-
tion of probable cause should be paid great deference by reviewing
courts,' '"12 which should not take the form of de novo review. 2
The Supreme Court explained that "'A grudging or negative atti-
tude by reviewing courts toward warrants' [will tend to discourage
police officers" and that "'courts should not invalidate warrant[s]
by interpreting affidavit[s] in a hypertechnical, rather than a com-
monsense, manner.' "124 Applying this standard, the Supreme Court
found that the judge issuing the warrant had a substantial basis to
conclude that probable cause existed.126
Gates remains good law' 26 and establishes the current require-
ments of probable cause to issue a search warrant and the proper
appellate standard of review for such determinations - a substan-
tial basis. Nonetheless, the importance of Gates has been decreased
by the subsequent Supreme Court decision in United States v.
Leon.' 27
2. The Good-Faith Exception: United States v. Leon
The significance placed upon a magistrate's probable cause deter-
mination in Gates was subsequently reduced by the Supreme Court
in United States v. Leon."' In Leon, the Supreme Court held that
evidence obtained by law enforcement officers acting with reasona..
ble reliance on an ultimately invalid search warrant issued by a de-
122. Gates, 462 U.S. at 236 (quoting Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 419 (1969)).
123. Id.
124. Id. (quoting United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108-09 (1965)).
125. Id. at 246.
126. The Supreme Court has continued to adhere to the substantial basis standard of reviewing
probable cause determinations in warrant cases subsequent to Gates. See, e.g., New York v. P.J.
Video, Inc., 475 U.S. 868, 875 (1986) (holding that an application for a search warrant to seize
allegedly obscene movies should be subjected to the same test of probable cause as other applica-
tions for search warrants even though the First Amendment was implicated); United States v.
Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 915 (1984) ("[R]eviewing courts will not defer to a warrant based on an
affidavit that does not 'provide the magistrate with a substantial basis for determining the exis-
tence of probable cause.'" (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 239 (1983))); Massachusetts
v. Upton, 466 U.S. 727, 728 (1984) ("[A] reviewing court is not to conduct a de novo determina-
tion of probable cause, but only to determine whether there is substantial evidence in the record
supporting the magistrate's decision to issue the warrant.").
The Supreme Court has also used the clearly erroneous standard of review in other contexts
without mentioning the substantial basis standard. See. e.g., Citibank N.A. v. Wells Fargo Asia
Ltd., 495 U.S. 660, 670 (1990) (holding that a district court's factual findings concerning the
scope of the parties' prior agreement will not be reversed unless clearly erroneous).
127. 468 U.S 897 (1984).
128. Id.
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tached and neutral magistrate would not be barred at trial.' 29 The
Supreme Court has thus adopted a "good-faith exception" to the
exclusionary rule.13 0 In Leon, the Court accepted the conclusion of
the Ninth Circuit that the search warrant was invalid because it
was based on a police officer's affidavit containing improper infor-
mation from a confidential informant. 131 The Ninth Circuit had
ruled that the affidavit was insufficient to establish probable cause to
issue a search warrant because: (a) the information included in the
affidavit was stale and (b) the affidavit established neither the in-
formant's credibility nor the informant's basis of knowledge.' 32 The
government's petition for certiorari expressly declined to seek review
of this determination. 3
In adopting a good-faith exception, the Court first declared that
the goal of the exclusionary rule was to discourage police miscon-
duct when there was no evidence that either judges or magistrates
had been affected by the exclusion of evidence seized unconstitution-
ally.' 34 Furthermore, "as neutral judicial officers, [judges and mag-
istrates] have no stake in the outcome of particular criminal prose-
cutions," and thus could not be expected to be deterred by the
threat of exclusion of evidence at trial.' 35 The Court next reasoned
that the goal of the exclusionary rule would not be met by excluding
evidence in cases where the police officer's conduct was objectively
reasonable because the officer would not alter such reasonable con-
duct in the future.' 36 The Court concluded that application of the
exclusionary rule was inappropriate in these instances.' 37
The Leon decision has the practical effect of reducing the signifi-
cance of a magistrate's probable cause determination because evi-
dence seized on the basis of a good faith reliance on a search war-
rant can now be used at trial even if there was, in fact, no probable
129. Id. at 925.
130. The exclusionary rule requires that evidence obtained in violation of the Constitution may
not be used against an accused at trial. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 652 (1961).
131. 468 U.S. at 901. The Ninth Circuit's determination was based upon the two-part test
established in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964), and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410
(1969). Gates, which overruled these holdings, had not been decided at the time the case was
argued before and decided by the Ninth Circuit. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 904.
132. Leon, 468 U.S. at 904-05.
133. Id. at 905.
134. Id. at 916.
135. Id. at 917.
136. Id. at 919-20 (citing Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 539-40 (1976) (White, J.,
dissenting)).
137. Id. at 922.
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cause to issue the search warrant.
E. Federal Appellate Court Interpretations of Gates
Federal appellate courts have interpreted Gates differently. Some
federal circuits apply the clear error standard to review probable
cause to search in both warrant and warrantless cases, while other
circuits apply the "substantial basis" standard of review without
equating the standard to clear error.1 3 8
1. Appellate Courts That Apply Clear Error Review
The Seventh 39 and Ninth 4 ' Circuits apply the clear error stan-
138. Under this interpretation of Gates, the substantial basis standard may be considered a
standard of intermediate deference, between clear error and de novo. The Seventh Circuit has
described the nature of this intermediate standard with respect to a magistrate's determination of
probable cause to be,
given considerable weight and should be overruled only when the supporting affidavit,
read as a whole in a realistic and common sense manner, does not allege specific facts
and circumstances from which the magistrate could reasonably conclude that the
items sought to be seized are associated with the crime and located in the place
indicated.
United States v. Pritchard, 745 F.2d 1112, 1120 (7th Cir. 1984). In Pritchard, the defendant was
convicted in a district court of unlawful possession of firearms and unlawful possession of wiretap-
ping equipment. Id. at 1114. The defendant appealed to the Seventh Circuit, claiming that an
affidavit used to obtain the search warrant for the defendant's residence failed to establish proba-
ble cause. Id. at 1120. Information alleged in the affidavit had been obtained by the FBI from two
informants. Id. at 1114. In holding that the magistrate had a substantial basis to issue the war-
rant, the Seventh Circuit relied on the facts that the defendant was a suspected wiretapper, the
information was based on personal knowledge of the informants, the informants had previously
provided accurate information, and some of the informants' allegations were corroborated by FBI
surveillance. Id. at 1120-21.
In Rambis, the United States appealed from an order quashing a warrant to search a house
because the underlying affidavit did not establish probable cause. United States v. Rambis, 686
F.2d 620, 621 (7th Cir. 1982). The search uncovered an electronic detonating device that could
have been used to commit arson. Id. The Seventh Circuit held there was probable cause to issue
the warrant because the informant was an experienced agent who had previously proved reliable
and because the facts alleged in the affidavit established an inference that the device would be
found inside the house. Id. at 624.
139. United States v. Spears, 965 F.2d 262, 270 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 502 (1992).
140. United States v. Huguez-lbarra, 954 F.2d 546, 552 (9th Cir. 1992) ("We therefore find
that the magistrate's determination that sufficient probable cause existed to issue the warrant was
clearly erroneous .... "); United States v. McQuisten, 795 F.2d 858, 861 (9th Cir. 1986) ("We
may not reverse a magistrate's finding of probable cause unless it is clearly erroneous."); United
States v. Stanert, 762 F.2d 775, 779 (9th Cir. 1985) ("We may not reverse such a conclusion
[that probable cause existed] unless the magistrate's decision is clearly erroneous."); United
States v. Estrada, 733 F.2d 683, 684 (9th Cir. 1984) ("We may not reverse [a magistrate's deter-
mination of probable cause] unless it is clearly erroneous.").
The case relied upon by the above decisions as establishing the use of the clearly erroneous
standard, United States v. Seybold, 726 F.2d 502 (9th Cir. 1984), does not include any discussion
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dard to review a magistrate's determination of probable cause to
issue a search warrant. The Seventh Circuit's position, which is
identical to the Ninth Circuit's position, is discussed at length in
subsequent sections. 4' The Ninth Circuit has never addressed this
issue at length in its decisions.'4
In nonwarrant cases, the First, 43  Seventh, Eighth, 45  and
Tenth 146 Circuits apply the clear error standard to review probable
cause to search. United States v. Santana47 is a typical example of
this approach. In Santana, members of the Salem, New Hampshire
Police Department monitored conversations between an informant,
who was wearing a hidden microphone, and the defendant,
of the clearly erroneous standard of review in these situations.
141. See infra notes 166-232 and accompanying text.
142. See supra note 140.
143. See, e.g., United States v. Santana, 895 F.2d 850, 852 (1st Cir. 1990) (reviewing the
lower court's finding of probable cause under the clearly erroneous standard); United States v.
Moore, 790 F.2d 13, 15 (1st Cir. 1986) (same).
144. United States v. Spears, 965 F.2d 262, 271 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 502 (1992);
Llaguno v. Mingey, 763 F.2d 1560, 1565 (7th Cir. 1985) (holding that in a civil trial, the issue of
whether police had probable cause to enter and search a home without a warrant is a jury ques-
tion and therefore subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review on appeal as a finding of
fact). In Llaguno, the Court reversed and remanded the proceedings because of "cumulatively
serious trial errors" committed by the district court, thus allowing the plaintiffs to receive a new
trial. Llaguno, 763 F.2d at 1568.
145. United States v. Williams, 897 F.2d 1430, 1435 (8th Cir. 1990) (applying the clear error
standard to uphold a district court's determination that an officer had probable cause to arrest the
defendant). In Williams the court stated, "Probable cause [to conduct a warrantless arrest] exists
where the facts and circumstances within the arresting officer's knowledge were sufficient to war-
rant a prudent person in believing that the suspect had committed or was committing an offense."
Id. (citing United States v. Purham, 725 F.2d 450, 455 (8th Cir. 1984)). The appellate panel
found there was probable cause to arrest because the arresting officer testified that he saw the
defendant take a handgun from the defendant's waistband, place the handgun in a black pouch,
and place the pouch in the car in which the defendant was riding. Id. As a result of this finding,
evidence seized during a search incident to the defendant's arrest was held to be properly admitted
by the district court. Id. Thus, the conviction of the defendant for being a convicted felon in
possession of a firearm was affirmed. Id.
146. United States v. Fox, 902 F.2d 1508, 1513 (10th Cir.) (applying clear error analysis to
uphold a district court's finding that evidence seized during a warrantless search was admissible
against the defendant), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 874 (1990). In Fox, the evidence was seized during
a search incident to the defendant's arrest by agents of the Drug Enforcement Administration. Id.
The arrest of the defendant was also performed without a warrant. Id. The evidence was used to
convict the defendant of conspiracy to possess cocaine with the intent to distribute, conspiracy to
distribute cocaine, and interstate travel for the purpose of promoting unlawful activity. Id. The
Fox court stated that the decision of the lower court was not clearly erroneous because "the
totality of these circumstances, viewed in the light most favorable to the government, supports the
district court's finding that the agents had probable cause to arrest Fox .... " Id. The circum-
stances included the knowledge by the arresting officers that the defendant had participated in
numerous meetings and discussions concerning purchases of cocaine. Id.
147. 895 F.2d 850 (lst Cir. 1990).
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Santana. 4 8 The informant told police he had previously purchased
cocaine from Santana at a house in Lawrence, Massachusetts.'" On
September 21, 1988, the informant told Santana he wished to
purchase approximately three kilograms of cocaine from him.150 The
transaction was scheduled for 2:00 p.m. that day.' Santana told
the informant that his driver's license had been suspended in New
Hampshire and that he would not drive to the location of the
purchase.' 52 At approximately 3:00 p.m. on September 21, a police
officer who was observing the house in Lawrence, Massachusetts, to
which Santana's beeper phone number was registered, saw two
males leave the house and enter a car parked on the street. 153 One
of the males, the co-defendant Juan Tejada, was carrying a package
under his arm as he entered the automobile. 15 The Salem Police
Department also conducted surveillance of the area by aircraft. 55
After the car had entered New Hampshire, it was stopped by uni-
formed Salem police officers.' 56 An officer with special expertise in
searching for contraband discovered the cocaine in a plastic bag
near the engine block. 15 The defendants, who had not consented to
a search of the front of the car, both entered conditional pleas of
guilty to a charge of possession with intent to distribute cocaine. 58
Santana appealed the denial by the district court of his motion to
suppress the evidence based upon the court's erroneous determina-
tion that the police had probable cause to believe the car contained
contraband. 59 The First Circuit, after stating the appropriate stan-
dard of review to be clear error, held that the district court's deter-
mination was not clearly erroneous. 60 The First Circuit stated that,
under the totality of the circumstances, probable cause was estab-
lished through the monitoring by the police of the conversation be-
tween the informant and Santana, the information that Santana's
148. Id. at 851.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 850-51.
159. Id. at 851-52.
160. Id. at 852 (citing United States v. Figureroa, 818 F.2d 1020, 1024 (lst Cir. 1987)).
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beeper number was registered to a house in Lawrence, Massachu-
setts, the information that the informant had purchased cocaine
from Santana in the same house, and the expectation of the police
that Santana would proceed to a designated location from the house
in the presence of another person as a result of the suspension of
Santana's driver's license. 6 '
All Circuits apply clear error to review the existence of one or
more of the exceptions to the presumptive unreasonableness of war-
rantless searches.'62 Clear error is applied because the exceptions
are considered to be questions of fact. 63
United States v. Sewell"' illustrates this use of clear error review.
In Sewell, Chicago Police narcotics officers conducted surveillance
of the Chicago apartment of the defendant Sewell.6 5 At about
10:00 p.m., the officers observed approximately fifteen people enter
and leave the building within ten minutes, after spending only a few
moments inside the apartment.6 One of the officers entered the
apartment building and knocked on the defendant's door. 67 After
Sewell opened the door, the officer asked Sewell for ten dollars
worth of marijuana laced with phencyclidine (PCP).6 8 After the of-
ficer gave the defendant ten dollars, Sewell handed the money to his
161. Id. Although the First Circuit, in Santana, invoked the automobile exception to the re-
quirement of obtaining a search warrant, the court did not rely upon this exception in its holding
that the probable cause determination was not clearly erroneous. See id. at 852-53. The case thus
supports the use of the clear error standard to review a warrantless search and seizure even with
the absence of an exception to the presumptive unreasonableness of warrantless searches.
162. See, e.g., United States v. Preciado-Robles, 954 F.2d 566, 569 (9th Cir. 1992) (applying
the clear error standard to review consent); United States v. Vasquez, 953 F.2d 176, 179 (5th
Cir.) (applying clear error review to exigent circumstances), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2288 (1992);
United States v. Sewell, 942 F.2d 1209, 1213 (7th Cir, 1991) (same); United States v. Lopez, 937
F.2d 716, 722 (2d Cir.) (applying clear error analysis to review factual findings of exigent circum-
stances); United States v. Reed, 935 F.2d 641, 642 (4th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 423
(1991); United States v. Antoon, 933 F.2d 200, 204 (3d Cir. 1991) (applying the clear error
standard to review consent), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 300 (1991); United States v. Valdez, 931
F.2d 1448, 1451 (11th Cir. 1991) (applying the clear error standard to review consent); United
States v. Lewis, 921 F.2d 1294, 1301 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (same); United States v. Radka, 904 F.2d
357, 361 (6th Cir. 1990) (applying clear error review to exigent circumstances); United States v.
Arcobasso, 882 F.2d 1304, 1306 (8th Cir. 1989) (same); United States v. Freeman, 816 F.2d 558,
562 (10th Cir. 1987) (applying the clear error standard to review consent); United States v.
Moore, 790 F.2d 13, 15 (1st Cir. 1986) (applying clear error analysis to review factual findings of
exigent circumstances).
163. See supra note 128.
164. 942 F.2d 1209 (7th Cir. 1991).
165. Id. at 1210.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
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wife inside the apartment and gave the officer a tin foil packet.'" 9
The officer looked through the doorway and observed a crushed
green plant, tin foil packets, money, and a high caliber handgun on
a table inside the apartment.17 0 After displaying his badge to the
defendant, the officer prevented Sewell from closing the door, pur-
sued Sewell into the apartment, and arrested him.17 ' Another officer
entered the apartment and followed Sewell's wife, who had grabbed
items from the table and run to the rear of the apartment.17 After
arresting Sewell's wife, the officer's seized the gun, marijuana, PCP,
cash, and the tin foil packets.'7
After pleading guilty to possessing a narcotic drug with intent to
distribute and illegal possession of a firearm, Sewell appealed the
denial by the district court of his motion to suppress the evidence,
arguing that no exigent circumstances were present to justify the
entry by the officers.' The Seventh Circuit, applying clear error to
review the denial of the motion, held that exigent circumstances
were present. 75 The court stated that the officer could see through
the door all of the elements of narcotics trafficking and, after the
officers identified themselves as police officers, there was a realistic
expectation that any delay in the apprehension of the defendants
would result in the destruction of evidence.' 76
2. Appellate Courts That Apply Substantial Basis Review
The First, 77 Second, 78  Third, 179  Fourth, 180  Fifth,' Sixth, 82
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 1211.
175. Id. at 1212-13.
176. Id. The Seventh Circuit also relied heavily upon its decision in United States v. Fleming,
677 F.2d 602 (7th Cir. 1982), for its holding that warrantless entry by the officers into the home
of the defendant was constitutional. See Sewell, 942 F.2d at 1211-12.
177. See, e.g., United States v. Nocella, 849 F.2d 33, 39 (1st Cir. 1988) ("What matters, in the
long run, is whether the issuing magistrate had a 'substantial basis' for finding that probable cause
was extant."). But see United States v. Curzi, 867 F.2d 36, 45 (1st Cir. 1989) (reviewing for clear
error a district court's determination that the remainder of a search warrant affidavit, after ex-
cluding impermissible references to tainted evidence, did not establish probable cause).
178. See, e.g., United States v. Jakobetz, 955 F.2d 786, 804 (2d Cir.) ("Together, these consid-
erations provide sufficient basis for determining that the information supplied in the affidavit was
not stale."), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 104 (1992); United States v. Ponce, 947 F.2d 646, 650 (2d
Cir. 1991) (quoting the probable cause test of Gates without mentioning clear error), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 1492 (1992); Rivera v. United States, 928 F.2d 592, 602 (2d Cir. 1991) (quoting the
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Eighth,183 Tenth,"' Eleventh,1 85 and District of Columbia 8 ' Cir-
cuits apply the substantial basis standard when reviewing a magis-
trate's determination of probable cause to issue a search warrant,
"substantial basis" language of Gates without mentioning clear error).
179. See, e.g., United States v. American Investors of Pittsburgh, Inc., 879 F.2d 1087, 1105
(3d Cir.) (stating that a magistrate must have had a substantial basis for determining that proba-
ble cause existed), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 955 (1989), and cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1021 (1990);
United States v. Kepner, 843 F.2d 755, 762 (3d Cir. 1988) ("Accordingly, the magistrate issued a
warrant because a common-sense interpretation of the affidavit provided a substantial basis for
concluding that probable cause existed.").
180. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 920 F.2d 235, 240 (4th Cir. 1990) (stating that
"[a]ppellants correctly state[d] that a magistrate must have a 'substantial basis' for concluding
that probable cause exists" and equating the existence of probable cause with the totality of the
circumstances analysis of Gates); United States v. Suarez, 906 F.2d 977, 984 (4th Cir. 1990)
(holding, without mentioning clear error, that "[a] magistrate's finding of probable cause is sub-
ject to great deference on review"), cert. denied, Ill S. Ct. 790 (1991).
181. See, e.g., United States v. Wake, 948 F.2d 1422, 1428 (5th Cir. 1991) (citing the "sub-
stantial basis" language of Gates without mentioning clear error and stating that "[o]n its face,
the affidavit provided a sufficient basis to find the requisite probable cause"), cert. denied, 112 S.
Ct. 2944 (1992); United States v. McKeever, 906 F.2d 129, 132 (5th Cir. 1990) ("There was a
substantial basis for finding probable cause in this case."), cert. denied, III S. Ct. 790 (1991).
182. See, e.g., United States v. Davidson, 936 F.2d 856, 859 (6th Cir. 1991) ("Our review of
the affidavit in this case reveals a substantial basis for concluding that a search of Davidson's
apartment 'would uncover evidence of wrongdoing.' ") (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213,
236 (1983)); United States v. Pelham, 801 F.2d 875, 878 (6th Cir. 1986) ("[T]he information
contained in the affidavit, which was based on the statements of a named informant, gave the
issuing magistrate a substantial basis for concluding that a search would uncover evidence of
wrongdoing."), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1092 (1987); United States v. Loggins, 777 F.2d 336, 338
(6th Cir. 1985) (per curiam) ("The standard of review in this case is whether the magistrate had
a substantial basis for finding that the affidavit established probable cause to believe that the
evidence would be found at the place cited.").
183. See, e.g., United States v. Anderson, 933 F.2d 612, 614 (8th Cir. 1991) (concluding that
the magistrate had a substantial basis for determining the existence of probable cause); United
States v. Kail, 804 F.2d 441, 444 (8th Cir. 1986) (stating that a magistrate must have had a
substantial basis for determining that probable cause existed).
184. See, e.g., United States v. Morehead, 959 F.2d 1489, 1498 (10th Cir. 1992) (quoting the
"substantial basis" language of Gates without mentioning clear error); United States v. Harris,
903 F.2d 770, 774 (10th Cir. 1990) (citing the "substantial basis" language of Gates without
mentioning clear error).
185. See, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez, 940 F.2d 1413, 1419 (11th Cir. 1991) (stating that
substantial basis is the appropriate standard without mentioning clear error), cert. denied, 112 S.
Ct. 910, and cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1194 (1992). But see United States v. Hooshmand, 931 F.2d
725, 735 (11 th Cir. 1991) (stating that the denial of a motion to suppress for insufficient probable
cause to issue a warrant was a mixed question of law and fact, and applying clear error to the
findings of fact but reviewing de novo the application of law to those facts).
186. See, e.g., United States v. Vaughn, 830 F.2d 1185, 1187 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (stating that "in
light of the mutually supporting nature of the statements made by the reliable informant and the
Source of Information," there was a substantial basis for the magistrate's conclusion that probable
cause existed (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 F.2d 213, 238-39 (1983) (citation omitted)); United
States v. Laws, 808 F.2d 92, 106 (D.C. Cir. 1986) ("We hold that the affidavits in the case at bar
provided the judge issuing the warrant with 'a "substantial basis for ... concluding" that proba-
ble cause existed' . . . .") (quoting Gates, 462 F.2d at 238-39).
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and do so without equating the standard to clear error. 18 7 These cir-
cuits rely on the language of Gates for their position and do not
elaborate further on the appropriate standard.' 88 No circuit applies
this standard to review probable cause to conduct warrantless
searches and seizures.
United States v. Davidson'89 presents a typical example of the
application of substantial basis review. In Davidson, an affidavit
submitted by an agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration was
used to obtain a search warrant on August 11, 1989, for the apart-
ment of the defendan.t Davidson. 190 The affidavit described surveil-
lance reports from November 2, 1988, to August 9, 1989, of meet-
ings between the defendant and "other individuals known to have
S-criminal records for illegal drug distribution."'' The affidavit re-
ported that Davidson 'had been observed on more than one occasion
using a public telephone in the presence of co-defendant Marvin
Mulligan. 192 The affidavit also stated that the defendant was ob-
served more than once traveling in an automobile with Florida li-
cense plates registered to a suspected drug trafficker. 93 The search
of the defendant's apartment revealed a quantity of fentanyl, a con-
trolled substance, which was seized by law enforcement officers.1
9 4
A jury found Davidson guilty of conspiracy to possess heroin and
cocaine with intent to distribute. 95 Davidson appealed to the Sixth
Circuit arguing that the search of his residence was conducted with-
out probable cause to believe that evidence or contraband would be
found at the apartment. 9 The Sixth Circuit rejected this argument
and held that the totality of the circumstances presented in the affi-
davit provided a substantial basis for finding probable cause to
search the residence. 97 The Sixth Circuit referred to two specific
surveillance reports in the affidavit that stated that in July and Au-
187. The Tenth Circuit also applies the substantial basis standard of review to the issue of
whether a magistrate had probable cause to issue an arrest warrant without stating the clearly
erroneous standard of review. St. John v. Justmann, 771 F.2d 445, 448 (10th Cir. 1985) (citing
Whiteley v. Warden, Wyo. State Penitentiary, 401 U.S. 560, 564 (1971)).
188. See supra notes 144-54 and accompanying text.
189. 936 F.2d 856 (6th Cir. 1991).
190. Id. at 857.
191. Id. (quoting Affidavit of DEA Agent).
192. Id. at 859.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 858.
195. Id. at 857.
196. Id. at 858-59.
197. Id. at 859-60.
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gust of 1989 an officer overhead "cryptic" references to drugs in
conversations between the co-defendant Mulligan and other men af-
ter Mulligan had traveled to the defendant's apartment. 198
3. Appellate Courts That Apply De Novo Review
The Second, 199 Third,"' ° Fourth, 01 Fifth,20 2 Sixth,20 3 Ninth,0 4
Eleventh,205 and District of Columbia Circuits 26  review probable
cause to conduct a warrantless search or seizure as a mixed question
of law and fact, applying clear error review to the factual findings of
a lower court and de novo review to the lower court's conclusions of
law. These circuits do not consider the appropriate standard to be at
issue in their decisions. 07
United States v. Cooper °8 illustrates the use of de novo review to
find the absence of probable cause to conduct a warrantless search.
In Cooper, police officers in Waco, Texas received a telephone call
at approximately midnight on July 14, 1989, from an informant
198. Id.
199. See, e.g., United States v. Gorski, 852 F.2d 692, 694 (2d Cir. 1988) (reviewing de novo
probable cause to conduct a warrantless search and seizure of the defendant's bag).
200. See, e.g., United States v. Salmon, 944 F.2d 1106, 1123 (3d Cir. 1991) (reviewing de novo
probable cause to conduct a warrantless search of a vehicle), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1213 (1992).
201. See, e.g., United States v. Campbell, 945 F.2d 713, 715 (4th Cir. 1991) (applying de novo
review and stating, in dictum, that probable cause probably existed to search a residence); United
States v. Ricks, 776 F.2d 455, 465 (4th Cir. 1985) (applying de novo review to probable cause to
conduct a warrantless search of the defendant's apartment residence), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1009
(1986), and cert. denied. 493 U.S. 1047 (1990).
202. See, e.g., United States v. Cooper, 949 F.2d 737, 744 (5th Cir. 1991) ("Nevertheless, the
ultimate question of the legality of the search or seizure of Cooper's car is a question of law alone
and thus subject to de novo review.") (citing United States v. Muniz-Melchor, 894 F.2d 1430,
1433 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 923 (1990)).
203. See, e.g., United States v. Straughter, 950 F.2d 1223, 1230 (6th Cir. 1991) (classifying
both probable cause and exigent circumstances as mixed questions and reviewing de novo the
conclusions of law of the district court), cert denied, 112 S. Ct. 1238, and cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
1505, and cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1601 (1992).
204. See, e.g., Hopkins v. City of Sierra Vista, 931 F.2d 524, 527 (9th Cir. 1991) (reviewing de
novo the granting of summary judgment to the defendants because probable cause existed to con-
duct a warrantless search).
205. See, e.g., United States v. Ramos, 933 F.2d 968, 972 (11th Cir. 1991) (stating that fac-
tual findings are reviewed under clear error doctrine while findings of law are reviewed de novo);
United States v. Tobin, 923 F.2d 1506, 1510 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 299 (1991);
United States v. Hurtado, 779 F.2d 1467, 1477 (11th Cir. 1985) ("[P]robable cause is purely a
question of law and hence subject to plenary review by this court.").
206. See, e.g., United States v. Garrett, 959 F.2d 1005, 1007 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (classifying the
existence of probable cause for a warrantless search as a mixed question of law and fact and
reviewing de novo the legal conclusions of the trial court).
207. See supra notes 156-63 and accompanying text.
208. 949 F.2d 737 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2945 (1992).
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stating that the defendant Cooper was suspected of the robbery of a
convenience store in Mart, Texas, located a few miles from Waco.2"9
Police officers in Mart told officers in Waco that an arrest warrant
had been issued for Cooper. 210 The Waco police officers located
Cooper's car in a parking area at the address furnished by the in-
formant and began conducting surveillance of the car.21' At approx-
imately 4:30 a.m., unidentified persons drove the car from the park-
212ing area. The police stopped the car in order to arrest Cooper
after the car had traveled about two and one half blocks. 13 Al-
though*Cooper was not in the car, the police conducted a warrant-
less search of the car and found a sawed-off shotgun in the trunk.2""
Cooper was subsequently. arrested and. indicted by a federal grand
jury of one count of unlawful possession of an unregistered fire-
arm.215 After the district court denied Cooper's motion to suppress
evidence of the shotgun, Cooper was convicted by a jury.21 6
Cooper appealed to the Fifth Circuit, arguing that there was no
probable cause tosearch his car because the sole reason for stopping
the car had been to arrest Cooper.217 The Fifth Circuit, applying de
novo review, agreed with Cooper.218 The Fifth Circuit stated that
probable cause was absent'because the Mart officers and the Waco
officers neither knew nor believed that the shotgun was in Cooper's
car nor searched Cooper's car because they believed it might con-
tain the shotgun.219
4. The Standard Applied by the Seventh Circuit
The Seventh Circuit applies the clear error standard to review
warrantless searches and probable cause to issue a search war-
rant.2 12  Within the last two years, five separate opinions appearing
209. Id. at 740.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 741.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 744.
218. Id. at 744-46.
219. Id. at 745. The Fifth Circuit held, however, that the district court properly refused to
suppress evidence of the shotgun because the police had probable cause to believe the car itself
was an instrument or evidence of a crime and because they conducted a proper inventory search
subsequent to its seizure. Id. at 747-48.
220. United States v. Spears, 965 F.2d 262 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 502 (1992).
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in two Seventh Circuit cases have addressed this issue.22 The facts
and procedural background of these cases must be examined before
discussing the Seventh Circuit's position concerning the appropriate
standard of review.
Two recent Seventh Circuit decisions discuss the proper standard
of appellate review for a magistrate's determination that probable
cause existed to issue a search warrant. In United States v. McKin-
ney,222 the majority of an appellate panel held that the proper stan-
dard was whether the magistrate had a "substantial basis" for find-
ing that probable cause existed, an intermediate standard of
review.23 This holding was subsequently reversed in United States
v. Spears,224 where an appellate panel held that clear error was the
appropriate standard to review probable cause to conduct both war-
rant and warrantless searches. 25
In McKinney, the defendant was arrested at his home in Spring-
field, Illinois after a search of his residence by Illinois State Police
and agents of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms.2 The
search uncovered seven plastic bags of cocaine and six firearms. 27
The search was performed pursuant to a search warrant issued by a
U.S. magistrate.22 8 The warrant was based on an affidavit signed by
an Illinois State Police officer, which stated that a woman named
Carla Brown told the officer that she had observed cocaine, drug
paraphernalia, marijuana, and firearms in the defendant's resi-
dence.229 Brown said the cocaine was located in the front bedroom
of the defendant's residence while the firearms were located in the
closet of the front bedroom.230 She also observed the defendant sell-
ing one-half gram of cocaine to a female customer and stated that
the defendant had fired shots at her with a machine gun. 1
A thirteen-count indictment charged McKinney with possession
221. Id.; United States v. McKinney, 919 F.2d 405 (7th Cir. 1990).
222. 919 F.2d 405, 405 (7th Cir. 1990).
223. Id. at 405. The standard is "intermediate" in the sense that it encompasses less judicial
deference than the clearly erroneous standard of appellate review but more judicial deference than
the de novo standard of appellate review. See id. at 421 (Posner, J., concurring).
224. 965 F.2d at 262.
225. Id. at 270-71.
226. McKinney, 919 F.2d at 407.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id.
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with intent to distribute cocaine, use of a firearm during and in rela-
tion to a drug trafficking crime, and unlawful possession of a firearm
by a convicted felon.232 Before the trial, McKinney filed a motion to
suppress the evidence seized through the search warrant, arguing
that there was no probable cause to issue the warrant. 33 McKinney
specifically argued that the information in the officer's affidavit
should have been corroborated before the search warrant was issued
because the information was based on a confidential informant who
had a drug addiction and a prior criminal record.234 District Court
Judge Richard Mills of the United States District Court for the
Central District of Illinois, denied the motion and ruled that proba-
ble cause to issue the warrant existed under the Supreme Court's
decision in Gates.23 5
After McKinney waived a jury trial, the district court found him
guilty on a.11 charges.236 He was sentenced to 121 months imprison-
ment on the cocaine possession charge, 30 years on the unlawful
firearm possession charges, and 30 years on the unlawful firearm use
charges."' Hewas also sentenced to six years probation after re-
lease from prison. 8 He appealed to the Seventh Circuit claiming
that there was no probable cause to issue the search warrant and
that the lower court erred by upholding the validity of the war-
rant.239 Therefore, he argued, evidence seized on the basis of the
warrant should have been excluded.2 40
The McKinney decision directly addressed the proper appellate
standard of review for a magistrate's determination that probable
cause existed to issue a search warrant. In affirming McKinney's
convictions on all counts, Circuit Judge Joel Flaum upheld the mag-
istrate's decision to issue the search warrant for McKinney's resi-
dence and stated that the applicable standard for appellate courts
was whether the magistrate had a "substantial basis" for issuing the
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 407-08 (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983)).
236. Id. at 408.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id. McKinney also argued that the evidence was insufficient to establish his guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt and that the sentences he received for his firearm possession and use convictions
violated the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 416. These claims are not
relevant to the present discussion.
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warrant, a standard he equated with intermediate deference." He
relied primarily on the decision of the Supreme Court in Gates.242
Judge Flaum first stated that the Supreme Court had never used
the substantial basis standard of review concurrently with the
clearly erroneous standard of review, and, therefore, appellate courts
should not presume the two standards to be the same. 4" The opin-
ion stated that the Supreme Court did not intend to implicitly reject
close appellate scrutiny of search warrants by its adoption of a
good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule in United States v.
Leon,244 a decision subsequent to Gates. 45 Judge Flaum declared
that Seventh Circuit precedent had always utilized an intermediate
standard for reviewing probable cause determinations and stated
that such a standard was more appropriate than the more deferen-
tial clearly erroneous standard because constitutional rights were at
issue in these cases.24 6
Although Judge Flaum acknowledged that the use of substantial
basis as an intermediate standard created multiple levels of appel-
late review, he stated that this approach was preferable because the
clear error standard of review implicitly encompassed multiple levels
of review as well.247 Although the judge acknowledged that the sub-
stantial basis standard of review was imprecisely defined, the opin-
ion nevertheless concluded that the standard would be no more diffi-
cult to apply than was the magistrate's initial probable cause
determination. 4 8
Applying the substantial basis standard, Judge Flaum ruled that
the magistrate had probable cause to issue the search warrant. 49
He stated that the magistrate had a substantial basis to issue the
warrant because the affidavit stated that the informant had person-
ally observed the evidence within the defendant's residence and had
personally been the victim of a violent crime committed by the de-
241. Id. at 408-09. Judge Flaum equated the standard to intermediate deference because he
never considered it equivalent to clear error review while he acknowledged the standard to be
more deferential than de novo. See id.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 409.
244. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
245. 919 F.2d at 410.
246. Id. at 4 11-15.
247. Id. Specifically, Judge Flaum stated that the clearly erroneous standard of review could be
applied "rigorously" or it could be applied "as a symbol of appellate acquiescence." Id. at 415.
248. Id. at 414 n.12.
249. Id. at 416.
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fendant.25 ° Judge Flaum further reasoned that the informant's drug
addiction and criminal record were not sufficient to disregard the
affidavit because, under the Supreme Court's totality of the circum-
stances test in Gates, reliability was simply one relevant factor to be
considered by the magistrate.25' The challenged evidence was there-
fore obtained constitutionally, according to Judge Flaum.
District Court Judge Hubert L. Will of the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois, who was sitting by desig-
nation, filed a concurring opinion in support of the substantial basis
standard of review as an intermediate standard.252 Judge Will stated
that probable cause requires a higher degree of scrutiny than other
standards because probable cause is required by the Constitution.253
He further stated that there was a significant difference between the
substantial basis and the clearly erroneous standards of review, and
that the distinction was more than semantic.254 Judge Will also dis-
puted Judge Posner's proposition. that appellate judges were less
able to assess the facts upon which the issuance of a warrant was
based and therefore should review such issuances with less
scrutiny. 55
Circuit Judge Richard Posner filed a concurrence but declared
the appropriate appellate standard of review to be the clearly erro-
neous standard.25 Judge Posner relied on several appellate court
opinions adopting this standard in cases involving a search and
seizure performed without a warrant. 5 7 He also relied on a Seventh
Circuit opinion which adopted the clearly erroneous standard in re-
viewing a district court's denial of a motion to suppress evidence. 58
The concurrence stated that the application of law to fact is a ques-
250. Id. at 415-16.
251. Id. at 415 (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 234 (1983)).
252. Id. at 423 (Will, J., concurring).
253. Id. at 424.
254. Id. at 425. Judge Will stated that the difference was more than semantic because some
cases would be decided differently if the clearly erroneous standard was used in place of the
substantial basis standard of review. Id.
255. Id. Judge Will stated that appellate judges were usually just as able as magistrates to
assess the facts because almost all the facts relied upon by the magistrate will be contained in a
law enforcement agency's affidavit, which is available to the court of appeals. Further, no substan-
tial record is developed during warrant hearings. Id.
256. Id. at 418 (Posner, J., concurring).
257. Id. at 419 (citing United States v. Santana, 895 F.2d 850, 852 (1st Cir. 1990); United
States v. Williams, 897 F.2d 1430, 1435 (8th Cir. 1990); United States v. Fox, 902 F.2d 1508,
1513 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 874 (1990)).
258. Id. (citing United States v. D'Antoni, 856 F.2d 975 (7th Cir. 1988)).
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tion of fact for purposes of appellate review and, therefore, should
be reviewed under the clear error standard.259 Judge Posner also as-
serted that the dramatic increases in workloads for federal appellate
courts necessitated a looser standard of appellate review.260 Since
Gates had nowhere stated that substantial basis was to be an inter-
mediate and less deferential standard than clear error, Gates did not
prohibit the use of a clear error standard of review. 61 Posner fur-
ther declared that the application by the Seventh Circuit of less def-
erence to a district court's determination of probable cause in cases
that did not involve search warrants was inconsistent with giving
more deference to a magistrate's determination of probable cause in
the search warrant context. 2  Judge Posner contended that less ap-
pellate scrutiny was appropriate in warrant cases because appellate
judges were further removed than magistrates from the facts upon
which a search warrant was issued.2 6 ' He also relied upon Ninth
Circuit precedent adopting the clear error standard to review a
magistrate's probable cause determination in warrant cases. 64
McKinney was subsequently reversed by the Seventh Circuit in.
United States v. Spears.265 In Spears, the defendant was arrested on
August 31, 1988, in Peoria, Illinois after a search of his vehicle by
agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) revealed a radio
pager, a kilogram of cocaine, and $23,000 in cash. 26 The search
was conducted without a warrant. 267 The defendant's girlfriend had
previously told an officer of the Peoria County Sheriff's Police that
the defendant sold approximately a kilogram of cocaine a week and
frequently traveled to Florida to obtain cocaine.268 A confidential
259. Id.
260. Id. at 420 (Posner, J., concurring) (citing FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMM., REPORT OF
THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMM. 5, 110).
261. Id. at 421-22.
262. Id. at 419-20. Such a position would appear to be illogical because cases in which search
warrants are present involve constitutional rights and thus would deserve at least the same degree
of appellate scrutiny as cases that do not involve search warrants.
263. Id. at 419.
264. Id. at 420 (citing United States v. McQuisten, 795 F.2d 858, 861 (9th Cir. 1986)).
265. 965 F.2d 262 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 502 (1992). The court purported to
overrule McKinney; however, its authority to do so is questionable because the decisions were each
rendered by a three-judge panel of the Seventh Circuit. The Seventh Circuit subsequently de-
clined to rehear the case en banc preventing all members of the Seventh Circuit to decide the
issue. Id. at 282 (Flaum, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing). Therefore, the Spears decision,
as the most recent decision of the Seventh Circuit, is the law in the Seventh Circuit.
266. Spears, 965 F.2d at 266.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 265.
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informant had also informed an Assistant U.S. Attorney and an Illi-
nois State Police officer that the defendant frequently traveled to
Florida, New York, and Texas to purchase cocaine and that he
would return on August 31 in a black car carrying cocaine.26 9 Other
confidential sources had also informed the FBI of the defendant's
illegal activities. 7 °
The defendant was charged with conspiracy to distribute cocaine,
distribution of cocaine, and possession with intent to distribute. 1
He made a pretrial motion to suppress evidence seized from his ve-
hicle, alleging that the officers did not have probable cause, a war-
rant, or consent to search.272 The district court denied the motion.273
The defendant then pleaded guilty to the possession charge, reserved
the right to appeal denial of the motion, and was sentenced to im-
prisonment. 74 Spears appealed to the Seventh Circuit, arguing that
the District Court erred in denying the motion to suppress. 5
The Seventh Circuit, reversing McKinney,278 in an opinion by
Chief Judge William Bauer, affirmed the denial of the motion and
held that the proper standard of appellate review was clear error in
both warrant and warrantless cases.277 The opinion relied primarily
on the Supreme Court's opinions in Gates and Massachusetts v.
Upton278 and stated that these decisions required "plain and simple"
factual review that should be conducted under the deferential clear
error standard.2 79 The opinion then considered nonwarrant searches
and seizures, which were deemed a mixed question.280 Chief Judge
Bauer stated that because the test of probable cause was the same
in these situations under Gates, the standard of review should also
be clear error.281 The opinion thus adopted a single standard of ap-
pellate review, clear error, for all reasonable searches. 282 In applying
this standard, Chief Judge Bauer concluded that the district judge
269. Id. at 266.
270. Id.
271. Id. at 268.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. See supra notes 222-64 and accompanying text (discussing McKinney).
277. Spears, 965 F.2d at 270-71.
278. 466 U.S. 727, 728 (1984) (per curiam).
279. Spears, 965 F.2d at 270.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Id.
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was not clearly erroneous in determining that the agents had proba-
ble cause to conduct the search of Spears's vehicle."'
Chief Judge James Moran of the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Illinois, who was sitting by designation,
filed a concurring opinion that disapproved of the adoption of the
clear error standard of review." 4 He stated that clear error was a
"chameleonic" standard which would be applied with varying rigor
in different contexts.2"5 He stated that the clear error standard thus
did not necessarily require deference and minimal appellate scru-
tiny.28 6 Judge Flaum filed an opinion dissenting from a denial of a
rehearing of the case en banc on the appellate standard issue.28 7 His
dissent, which was joined by Circuit Judges Cummings, Cudahy,
and Ripple, essentially restated the arguments of the majority opin-
ion in McKinney.18 8
II. ANALYSIS
The Spears court ruled that clear error was the proper standard
for appellate review of a magistrate's probable cause determination
in the search warrant context.2 9 This decision overruled the McKin-
ney court, which had held that the substantial basis standard was an
independent standard, evoking less deference to the magistrate. 90
This Comment adopts the position set forth in the majority opinion
in Spears and Judge Posner's McKinney concurrence that the
clearly erroneous standard is the appropriate standard of review in
these situations and should be considered equivalent to the substan-
tial basis language of Gates.
A. Appellate Standards for Reviewing Search Warrants
The adoption of substantial basis as an independent standard of
review creates yet another standard of appellate review of a lower
court's determinations. 291 As discussed earlier, the Supreme Court
and the Ninth Circuit have recently stated the policy reasons for the
283. Id. at 272.
284. Id. at 281 (Moran, C.J., concurring).
285. Id. (citing United States v. McKinney, 919 F.2d 405, 411, 415 (7th Cir. 1990)).
286. Id. at 281.
287. Id. at 282 (Flaum, J., dissenting).
288. Id. at 282-83; cf United States v. McKinney, 919 F.2d 405 (7th Cir. 1990).
289. Spears, 965 F.2d 262.
290. McKinney, 919 F.2d at 409.
291. The substantial basis standard of review was held by the Seventh Circuit to encompass an
19931 1447
DEPA UL LA W RE VIE W
de novo and clearly erroneous standards.2 9 The analyses of both the
Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit indicate that the reasons un-
derlying the use of the clear error standard in other fact-intensive
contexts may not be applicable to a magistrate's probable cause de-
termination when issuing a search warrant. This is because most
magistrates issue warrants based solely on information contained in
a law enforcement officer's sworn affidavit. 93 Further, a warrant
hearing is not adversarial. 94 The law enforcement officer is usually
not cross-examined, and an informant, if one exists, does not usually
appear in court. 2 5 Thus, an appellate court is usually as close to the
facts as the magistrate making the initial probable cause determina-
tion.2"6 Therefore, although the appellate court may be required to
make a full evidentiary review under a less deferential standard
than clear error, the court is not in a worse position to make such a
review in warrant cases.297
There are strong countervailing considerations, however, to the
use of a standard of review other than clear error in warrant cases.
A less deferential standard of review has the effect of neglecting the
work of a lower court, as the appellate court is forced to engage in a
greater degree of legal analysis.2 98 Moreover, the precedential value
of a decision applying a less deferential standard of review may be
reduced since the appellate judges are expending more time and ef-
fort duplicating the work of a lower court.2 99 This is especially true
in cases involving search warrants because, as discussed above, an
appellate court usually has all the information that was available to
the magistrate when the probable cause determination was initially
made.3 00 The court of appeals therefore must spend more of its lim-
ited time and energy discussing which facts supported a finding of
probable cause and which did not and is less able to provide guid-
intermediate level of deference between the de novo and clearly erroneous standards of review. Id.
at 409.
292. See supra notes 32-40 and accompanying text.
293. McKinney, 919 F.2d at 425 (Will, J., concurring).
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. Id. at 425-26.
297. Id. at 426.
298. See Mars Steel Corp. v. Continental Bank N.A., 880 F.2d 928, 934 (7th Cir. 1989) (hold-
ing that appellate review of a lower court's decision to impose sanctions under Rule I I of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure would not be subject to de novo review).
299. Id. at 933-34 (citing Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573-76 (1985)).
300. See supra note 35.
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ance for magistrates in their future probable cause determinations.
This Comment next examines appellate standards for reviewing
probable cause to search in further detail. The Gates decision is an-
alyzed first, followed by an analysis of the use of the clearly errone-
ous standard to review applications of law to fact. The last part of
this section analyzes the Leon decision as it affects this issue. This
section concludes that the use of the clearly erroneous standard of
review is supported by both Supreme Court and appellate court
precedent.
B. Appellate Standards for Reviewing Probable Cause to Search
1. Gates Supports the Use of Clear Error Review
One interpretation of Gates is that the decision adopted a stan-
dard of review somewhere between clear error and de novo. Sup-
porters of this interpretation reason that the Supreme Court explic-
itly rejected the use of a de novo standard in its opinion, yet failed
to equate its substantial basis language with the clearly erroneous
standard of review.301 Further, the Supreme Court has used the
clearly erroneous standard of review in other contexts without men-
tioning the substantial basis test.3"2 Thus, some equate the substan-
tial basis test with a standard of review of intermediate deference,
between clear error and de novo.
Nevertheless, the Gates opinion is equally susceptible to the inter-
pretation that the substantial basis test constitutes a clear error
standard of review. The Gates opinion itself stated that "[a] magis-
trate's 'determination of probable cause should be paid great defer-
ence by reviewing courts.'" 33 This is inconsistent with the estab-
lishment of an intermediate standard of review that is less
deferential than clear error. Additionally, the substantial basis lan-
guage of Gates is semantically similar to the standard for judicial
review of administrative fact-findings, which will be affirmed on ap-
peal if such findings are supported by substantial evidence °.3 0  The
substantial evidence standard of review is considered to be equally
301. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238-39 (1983).
302. See, e.g., Citibank, N.A. v. Wells Fargo Asia Ltd., 495 U.S. 660, 670 (1990) (holding
that a district court's factual findings concerning the scope of the parties' prior agreement will not
be reversed unless clearly erroneous).
303. Gates. 462 U.S. at 236 (quoting Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 419 (1969)).
304. See. e.g., NLRB v. Buckley Broadcasting Corp., 891 F.2d 230, 232 (9th Cir. 1989), cert.
denied. 496 U.S. 925 (1990).
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or less deferential than the clearly erroneous standard of review305
The Gates opinion also does not state that the substantial basis test
must be employed by each reviewing court. Rather, it requires em-
ployment of this test only by the initial reviewing court.3 08 Thus, the
Gates decision supports the clearly erroneous standard of review for
appellate courts in search warrant cases.
Gates may also be read as endorsing the clearly erroneous stan-
dard of appellate review for two other reasons. First, the Gates court
never stated it was creating a new standard of appellate review to be
composed of intermediate deference.3"7 The case relied upon by the
Supreme Court in Gates for the requirement that a reviewing court
ensure that the magistrate had a substantial basis to issue the war-
308rant did not purport to establish a standard of appellate review.
In Jones v. United States,3"9 the substantial basis language was used
merely to describe the magistrate's probable cause determination
and did not mention appellate standards of review. 310 Thus, the Su-
preme Court would not have cited Jones if it had intended to create
a new standard of appellate review by using the words "substantial
basis."
Second, the totality-of-the-circumstances test of Gates is more
consistent with a clearly erroneous standard of review than with a
standard of less deference. Under Gates, a magistrate evaluating an
affidavit for probable cause must make a "practical, common-sense"
decision whether the information in the affidavit establishes proba-
ble cause.3" No single item in the affidavit is to be dispositive, and
the Supreme Court explicitly rejected the use of a "hypertechnical"
analysis by the magistrate. 1 2 This supports the use of the clearly
erroneous standard of review for appellate courts reviewing the
magistrate's decision. Since the magistrate is to apply a flexible
305. United States v. McKinney, 919 F.2d 405, 423 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J., concurring).
306. A magistrate's determination that probable cause existed to issue a warrant is usually
reviewed by a federal district court before the issue is raised in front of a U.S. appellate court. See
supra note 2.
307. See Gates, 462 U.S. at 236-37.
308. See Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 271 (1960).
309. Id. at 257.
310. Specifically, the Court in Jones stated, "The Commissioner need not have been convinced
of the presence of narcotics in the apartment. He might have found the affidavit insufficient and
withheld his warrant. But there was substantial basis for him to conclude that narcotics were
probably present in the apartment, and that is sufficient." Id. at 271. The words "substantial
basis" thus were not intended to describe a standard of appellate review.
311. Gates, 462 U.S. at 238.
312. Id. at 236.
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standard, appellate courts should not scrutinize the affidavit more
closely than the magistrate did by applying a standard of review of
less deference than clear error. By applying a standard of less defer-
ence, appellate courts may be doing more work than the magistrate
did in evaluating the affidavit. This is inconsistent with the function
of the court of appeals since the application for the search warrant
is made initially to the magistrate, not the court of appeals. The
appellate court is simply required to review the magistrate's proba-
ble cause determination and may not undertake its own probable
cause determination because the Supreme Court explicitly rejected
the use of de novo review by a court of appeals in Gates.13 In inter-
preting substantial basis as a standard of intermediate deference,
the court of appeals may be acting contrary to Gates by applying
more scrutiny to the law enforcement officer's affidavit than the Su-
preme Court intended the magistrate to apply. Gates thus supports
the clearly erroneous standard of appellate review for a magistrate's
decision to issue a search warrant.
The reasonableness of these interpretations of Gates is confirmed
by appellate adoptions of both standards. The Ninth Circuit applies
the clearly erroneous standard of review to a magistrate's probable
cause determination in warrant cases.3"4 Other appellate courts,
however, apply the substantial basis test in these situations as an
intermediate standard, somewhere between clearly erroneous and de
novo.
31 5
In his McKinney concurrence, Judge Posner stated that although
the Ninth Circuit's position was in the minority, such a position was
preferable because of the "great deference" language of Gates.3 16
This argument was quoted favorably by the majority opinion in
Spears.1 7 Judge Will responded in his McKinney concurrence by
stating that a "more stringent" standard of review than clear error
was merited in cases involving search warrants because constitu-
tional rights were implicated. 18 Judge Will's response, however, ig-
nores the command of Gates that "after-the-fact scrutiny by courts
of the sufficiency of an affidavit should not take the form of de novo
313. Id.
314. See supra note 140.
315. See supra notes 129-38.
316. United States v. McKinney, 919 F.2d 405, 420 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J., concurring).
317. United States v. Spears, 965 F.2d 262, 270 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 502 (1992).
318. MeKinney, 919 F.2d at 425 (Will, J., concurring).
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review.19 It also ignores the fact that the Gates opinion did not
state that it was creating a new, intermediate standard of appellate
review. Furthermore, neither Judge Will nor Judge Flaum at-
tempted to define this new substantial basis standard of review other
than by citing the Gates opinion. 20 Judge Will attempted to articu-
late the difference between substantial basis and clear error as
follows:
But there is at least a psychological (and accordingly, in practice, a quite
real) difference between saying (a) that we will reverse only if the decision
below is clearly erroneous and (b) that we will affirm, if, giving deference to
the lower court's determination, that determination has a substantial basis.
The first formulation amounts to a recipe for almost routine affirmance. The
second, by contrast, ensures a more detailed and searching review than a
clear-error standard does and is the appropriate and correct standard for
reviewing constitutional determinations.3 1
Nevertheless, Judge Will did not mention any specific factual in-
stances where cases would be decided differently, nor, other than the
excerpt above, did he elaborate on the degree of judicial scrutiny
required by the substantial basis standard. 22
The substantial basis standard of review was defined more pre-
cisely by the Seventh Circuit in United States v. Pritchard.3 12 This
definition does not reflect a proper interpretation of Gates, however,
because the definition was derived from United States v. Rambis,324
decided before Gates. The amount of judicial deference required
under the substantial basis standard of review within the Seventh
Circuit under McKinney was, thus, unclear.
Since the Gates opinion is subject to two valid interpretations as
to the proper standard of appellate review, it would be useful to
examine the use of the clearly erroneous standard of appellate re-
view in cases that require the application of law to fact. Such cases
typically involve the application by a lower court of a rule of law to
a set of uncontested facts. As discussed below, this category applies
to a magistrate's issuance of a search warrant. Thus, other cases
involving fact/law applications may serve as precedential support
319. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983).
320. McKinney, 919 F.2d at 408, 426 (Will, J., concurring).
321. Id. at 425.
322. Id.
323. 745 F.2d 1112, 1120 (7th Cir. 1984).
324. 686 F.2d 620, 622 (7th Cir. 1982).
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for the use of the clearly erroneous standard of appellate review in
cases where a search warrant was issued.
2. Use of Clear Error in Applications of Law to Fact
A magistrate's determination that probable cause exists to issue a
search warrant is an application of law to fact.325 It entails the ap-
plication of a legal standard to a specific set of facts contained in a
law enforcement officer's affidavit. 26 The McKinney decision was
therefore inconsistent with Seventh Circuit precedent, which holds
that other mixed questions should be subject to the clearly erroneous
standard of appellate review. For example, the Seventh Circuit re-
views a district court's denial of a motion to suppress evidence under
the clear error standard.327 The Seventh Circuit also applies the
clear error standard when reviewing a trial court's decision to im-
pose Rule 11 sanctions in civil cases, which is also a mixed question
of law and fact.328 Other circuits also apply the clearly erroneous
standard of review to at least some applications of law to fact.329
Some appellate courts, however, apply a de novo standard of review
to mixed questions.3 3 0 Thus, the use of the clearly erroneous stan-
dard of review to mixed questions of law and fact has some, albeit
conflicting, precedential support.
The clearly erroneous standard has also been used to review
searches and seizures conducted by law enforcement officers without
a warrant. 31 In certain circumstances, law enforcement officers may
325. See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
326. See MeKinney, 919 F.2d at 420 (Posner, J., concurring) (stating that since the determina-
tion of whether the information in the affidavit submitted to the magistrate involves an application
of law, the appellate court is not limited to the clearly erroneous standard (quoting United States
v. Rambis, 686 F.2d 620, 622 (7th Cir. 1982))).
327. See supra notes 83-89 and accompanying text.
328. Mars Steel Corp. v. Continental Bank N.A., 880 F.2d 928, 933 (7th Cir. 1989). This is a
mixed question because a trial court judge must determine whether a pleading, motion, or other
paper
is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for
the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for
any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless
increase in the cost of litigation.
FED. R. Civ. P. II. This standard must be applied to an existing set of facts. Mars Steel, 880 F.2d
at 933.
329. See supra notes 42-44, 122-23, and accompanying text.
330. See supra notes 45, 104-05, 140-47, and accompanying text.
331. Although this may also be considered a mixed question of law and fact, it is being dis-
cussed separately because of its close factual similarity to searches and seizures conducted by law
enforcement officers with a warrant.
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conduct warrantless searches and seizures without violating the
Fourth Amendment, if they are based on probable cause.332 Several
circuits apply the clearly erroneous standard of review to a trial
court's probable cause determination in this context. 333 These cases
are analogous to a magistrate's determination of probable cause in
issuing a search warrant. Nonwarrant searches and seizures have
the same scope as those involving warrants,33 ' and, in both situa-
tions, an agent of the government is required to determine whether
an existing set of facts supports a determination of probable
cause. 35 The main difference is that in nonwarrant situations, such
a determination is made by a law enforcement officer, while in war-
rant situations, such a determination is made by a U.S. magistrate.
Thus, the use of the clearly erroneous standard of review in warrant
situations is supported by its use in appellate review of searches and
seizures conducted without a search warrant.
3. United States v. Leon Supports the Use of Clear Error Review
The significance of the magistrate's probable cause determination
itself was limited somewhat by the Supreme Court's adoption of a
"good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule.336 In Leon, the Su-
preme Court held that evidence obtained by officers acting in rea-
sonable reliance on a search warrant issued by a detached and neu-
tral magistrate, but ultimately found to be invalid, will not be
barred at trial.337 Evidence which would otherwise be barred be-
cause a magistrate made an incorrect determination of probable
cause will now be admitted under the "good faith" exception.338
332. See supra notes 4-7, 72-78, and accompanying text.
333. See supra notes 72-78 and accompanying text.
334. See supra notes 72, 76.
335. See supra notes 72-78 and accompanying text.
336. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
337. Id. at 908-13. The Supreme Court thus reversed the decision of the Ninth Circuit barring
large quantities of drugs and other evidence from being introduced into evidence in the defend-
ants' drug trafficking trial. Id. at 926.
In Leon, the Supreme court repeated the Gates language that a reviewing court should not
uphold the constitutionality of a search warrant if the magistrate did not have a substantial basis
for determining the existence of probable cause. Id. at 915. However, the Supreme Court also
stated, regarding the search warrant at issue, that "a reviewing court may properly conclude that,
notwithstanding the deference that magistrates deserve, the warrant was invalid because the mag-
istrate's probable-cause determination reflected an improper analysis of the totality of the circum-
stances, or because the form of the warrant was improper in some respect." Id. (citation omitted).
338. In Leon, the Supreme Court stated, however, that the good-faith exception "is not in-
tended to signal our unwillingness strictly to enforce the requirements of the Fourth Amendment."
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Although Leon did not discuss the choice of appellate standards
for reviewing a magistrate's probable cause determination, the deci-
sion reduces the import of appellate review of such determinations.
This is because evidence will now be admitted against an accused at
trial if the law enforcement officers acted in good faith in obtaining
the evidence pursuant to a search warrant. The choice of appellate
standard of review has no importance in these situations because the
evidence will be admitted regardless of whether an appellate court
finds that the magistrate did not have probable cause to issue the
search warrant.
The use of the clearly erroneous standard of appellate review in
cases where the law enforcement officers did not act in good faith is
more consistent with Leon than a standard of intermediate defer-
ence. Under Leon, evidence will be admitted at the trial of the de-
fendant regardless of whether there was probable cause to issue a
search warrant, as long as the officers acted in good faith. If the
good faith exception of Leon is raised by the prosecution to counter
a defendant's motion to suppress the evidence based on a lack of
probable cause, appellate scrutiny is shifted to determining whether
the law enforcement officers actually acted in good faith in ob-
taining the warrant, rather than determining whether the magistrate
had probable cause to issue the warrant.
Thus, Leon implicitly reduces the import of appellate scrutiny of
a magistrate's probable cause determination by shifting the focus of
that scrutiny in situations where good faith of law enforcement of-
ficers is at issue. This is consistent with the deferential clearly erro-
neous standard of appellate review in probable cause determinations
made by a magistrate where the good faith of law enforcement of-
ficers is not at issue. If the prosecution raises a Leon defense to re-
but a defendant's motion to suppress, the court of appeals will ex-
pend its energies scrutinizing whether good faith was present and
ignore the issue of whether the magistrate had probable cause to
issue a search warrant. If Leon is not implicated, the appellate court
will still scrutinize the probable cause determination but will grant
more deference under the clearly erroneous standard than under the
substantial basis standard of review. This is consistent with the re-
duction in importance of appellate scrutiny of these determinations
made by the Supreme Court in Leon.
Id. at 924.
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In summary, the use of the clearly erroneous standard to review a
magistrate's determination of probable cause to issue a search war-
rant is supported by both Supreme Court and appellate court
precedent.
C. The Substantial Basis Standard to Review Probable Cause
Has Less Practical Value Than Clear Error
The adoption of the substantial basis standard as an intermediate
standard of appellate review in warrant cases creates potential con-
fusion for those courts that use it. The Supreme Court in Gates
stated that such determinations "should be paid great deference by
reviewing courts." ' 9 The amount of deference to be accorded to
magistrate determinations in warrant cases under an intermediate
standard of appellate review is unclear. Gates does not answer this
question, and it is unlikely that an intermediate standard of appel-
late review, between clearly erroneous and de novo, would consist of
"great deference." Moreover, if by using the words "substantial ba-
sis" the Supreme Court meant only that such a standard of review
would encompass more deference than de novo, then the words
"great deference" should not have been used in describing the
standard.
As mentioned earlier, the adoption of substantial basis as an inde-
pendent standard of appellate review creates not merely a derivative
standard, but an entirely new one. In his concurring opinion in Mc-
Kinney, Judge Posner described such a scheme as "confusing, un-
workable, and unnecessary."3 " This description appears to have
merit since the substantial basis standard of appellate review is to
be composed of "great deference, ' ' 3, 1 yet is also to be less deferen-
tial than the clearly erroneous standard of appellate review. The
task of describing the precise contours of such a standard is indeed
difficult. Moreover, it is questionable whether such a task would be
339. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983).
340. United States v. McKinney, 919 F.2d 405, 423 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J., concurring). In
an opinion subsequent to McKinney, Judge Posner elaborated on his frustration with this ap-
proach. Morales v. Yeutter, 952 F.2d 954, 957 (7th Cir. 1991). In Morales, Judge Posner stated
that verbal differences in standards of review are "merely semantic," and the only real standards
of review are "plenary" and "deferential." Id. Further, the amount of deference to be applied by
an appellate court depended upon factors specific to each particular case, such as the nature of the
issue and the evidence, rather than the verbal standard of review. Id. This Comment does not
purport to address this argument and only examines the proper standard to review probable cause
to search.
341. Gates, 462 U.S. at 236.
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a worthwhile undertaking since none of the opinions in the Spears
or McKinney decisions provided any situation in which a different
result would be reached under the two standards of review. 342 The
vast rise in federal appellate caseloads over the past few years 33
suggests that appellate judicial effort should be expended elsewhere.
The use of substantial basis as an intermediate standard of appellate
review in warrant cases adds further complexity to appellate review
and would do little to change the result of most cases. Therefore, the
clear error standard of review has far greater practical value than
the substantial basis standard. The McKinney decision added uncer-
tainty to the search warrant process, which the Gates decision was
intended to resolve. This uncertainty was eliminated by the Spears
decision, which overruled McKinney.
CONCLUSION
The effect of the McKinney decision was to affirm the use of a
standard of appellate review of intermediate deference for a magis-
trate's probable cause determination in cases involving search war-
rants. 44 Under McKinney, there were three standards that could be
used to review probable cause to search, de novo, substantial basis,
and clearly erroneous, each encompassing a different level of judi-
342. Judge Will did state that some cases would be decided differently under the two standards,
but he declined to specify them. McKinney, 919 F.2d at 425 (Will, J., concurring).
343. A recent report by the Federal Courts Study Committee illustrates the huge increase in
the caseload for federal appellate judges. In 1945, an average of 26 appeals were pending before
each federal appellate judge. 2 FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMM., WORKING PAPERS AND SUB-
COMM. REPORTS 2, 25 (1990). This number rose to 91 appeals pending per judgeship in 1970, and
by 1989, there was an average of 192 appeals pending before each federal appellate judge. Id.
Federal appellate judges decide cases in panels of three. Id. In 1965, each federal appellate judge
participated in the disposition of an average of 136 cases while sitting on an appellate panel. Id.
By 1989, this number had risen to 382 cases per federal appellate panel. Id. When divided by
three, these numbers mean that each federal appellate judge terminated an average of 45 cases
per year in 1965, while in 1989 each judge terminated an average of 127 cases per year. Id. at 26.
The Committee found that this large rise in cases had not affected case processing times for
federal appellate judges. For example, the median time for processing each appeal was a little over
ten months in 1989, which was a few days less than that of 1980. Id. However, the Committee
stated that the increase in caseload presented serious dangers to the judicial process. The large
rise in federal appeals had decreased the percentage of cases that the Supreme Court was able to
decide, thus increasing the significance of appellate court decisions. Id. at 27. With the increased
caseload, these decisions could be written with less care and effort than previously. Id. Further,
appellate judges who were not writing the opinion for the panel would spend less time scrutinizing
the decision. Id.
344. In any event, the appellate panel was precluded from adopting a new standard of review in
these situations because the U.S. Attorney's office had not argued for a change in the standard of
review to the appellate court. McKinney, 919 F.2d at 427 (Will, J., concurring).
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cial deference. However, the amount of deference to be used by an
appellate judge when applying the substantial basis standard of re-
view to a magistrate's decision to issue a search warrant is indeter-
minate; an appellate judge must apply "great deference" to the
magistrate's decision,345 but it must not be so deferential as to apply
clear error review. The magistrate's decision could have been re-
versed only when the appellate judge had a "definite and firm" be-
lief that the magistrate had made a mistake.3 "4 The appellate judge
thus had very little guidance as to the degree of scrutiny to pay
probable cause determinations by magistrates after McKinney. Af-
ter Spears, the appellate judge applies only one standard, clear er-
ror, to review probable cause in both warrant and warrantless cases.
As discussed earlier, none of the opinions in McKinney stated any
specific instances in which the use of the clearly erroneous standard
of appellate review, rather than the substantial basis standard of ap-
pellate review, would lead to a different result in appellate court
decisions. 4" Thus, the real impact of the McKinney decision was to
further complicate federal appellate judicial review in general, and
the search warrant process in particular, for both judges and liti-
gants in the Seventh Circuit. 48 The impact of Spears was to elimi-
nate the complications caused by McKinney and thus simplify
search warrant jurisprudence in the Seventh Circuit.
Convicted defendants seeking to establish the invalidity of search
warrants in their cases must argue on appeal that the magistrate's
probable cause determination was erroneous, but before Spears, the
defendants had little guidance as to how clearly the error must have
been shown. They may have been more inclined to abandon this ar-
gument altogether if they believed that the evidence that demon-
strates the error is weak or that other arguments were more likely to
345. Gates, 462 U.S. at 236.
346. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948).
347. See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
348. Judge Posner's concurrence argued forcefully for a more deferential clearly erroneous
standard to review probable cause to search. Under the clearly erroneous standard of review,
adopted by the Seventh Circuit in Spears, appellate courts will be more inclined to affirm the
issuance of search warrants by magistrates. United States v. McKinney, 919 F.2d 405, 419-20
(7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J., concurring). The initial probable cause determination made by the
magistrate will, therefore, have greater significance because such decisions would be less likely to
be reversed. An intermediate standard of appellate review, however, creates less likelihood that
the magistrate's determination will be affirmed on appeal because the appellate courts would pay
less deference to the magistrate's findings. The magistrate's probable cause determination is less
important, however, because of the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S.
897 (1984). See supra text accompanying notes 116-23.
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result in a reversal of their convictions. Thus McKinney also served
to reduce the practical effect of the Fourth Amendment protection
afforded by a search warrant if defendants chose not to seek this
protection when appealing their convictions. The Spears decision.
eliminated this effect.
Both the clearly erroneous standard and the intermediate substan-
tial basis standard to review a magistrate's determination of proba-
ble cause to issue a search warrant are supported by Supreme Court
and federal appellate court precedent. Illinois v. Gates does not re-
solve the issue, and appellate courts have adopted both standards of
review. The use of the clearly erroneous standard of review by ap-
pellate courts in other situations supports its use here. The clearly
erroneous standard of review has greater practical value in warrant
cases than the intermediate substantial basis standard because the
substantial basis standard is difficult to define, complicates the
search warrant process, and may discourage defendants from seek-
ing Fourth Amendment protection. Therefore, the substantial basis
test established by the Supreme Court in Gates for appellate review
of a magistrate's finding that probable cause to issue a search war-
rant existed should not be deemed an independent standard of re-
view but, rather, should be equated with the clearly erroneous stan-
dard. Thus, the holding of the Seventh Circuit in United States v.
Spears was correct.
Peter J. Kocoras
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